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ABSTRACT
Abortion Politics and Family Life: An Interpretation
(May, 1981)
Patricia Coen Lynch, B.A. Newton College
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly
There are many dimensions to the American abortion controversy,
although it is examined and understood most often as if there were but
one issue involved. There have been few, if any, efforts to understand
the ideas and beliefs of all participants in the controversy, to explore
the possibility that beliefs about abortion are connected to other
political conflicts, and to suggest possibilities for compromise. These
are the tasks I have set for myself in my dissertation.
In the first chapter, I suggest why the controversy must be
re-examined, arguing that the popularized version of pro-abortionism
incorrectly assumes that a majority of Americans supports abortion on
demand. In fact, while many are not opposed to abortion in certain
instances, most oppose abortion merely at the discretion of the pregnant
woman. The reasons for the opposition suggest that important questions
such as the status of the fetus and the limits of individual rights have
not been definitely answered. Importantly, the Supreme Court's 1973
decisions, establishing abortion on demand, have been opposed by scien-
tists, biologists, and philosophers as well as religious and lay people.
Those most opposed to abortion on demand, as a group, are the
working class. In the second chapter, I explore and interpret this way
of life. I suggest that the ideal of the extended family is of such
great importance to working class people that they oppose any efforts
which could threaten or undermine that ideal. Abortion on demand is one,
perhaps the most easily articulated, threat to the ideal.
In the third chapter, I set out and critique the popularized version
of pro-abortionism, arguing that it misinterprets the strength of its
supporters and the motives of most anti-abortionists, fails to deal with
the issues of contraceptive responsibility and fetal personhood; and as
a coincidence encourages many working class people to move to the Right.
In the fourth chapter, I offer a deeper critique of pro-abortionism,
relying on the work of Judith Thompson and Garrett Hardin. I argue that
the liberal vision upon which pro-abortionism ^rests , has an implicit
side which celebrates continuity, moral conviction and family stability,
though its explicit aspects are at odds with these, threatening to under-
mine the completely liberal society.
In the final chapter, I argue that there is an abstract case for
compromise and reasons for the participants in the abortion controversy
to try to achieve a morally acceptable political compromise. The basis
would be the presumption of fetal personhood and the desire for family
stability. The state would most likely be in the position of aiding
those who choose to abort, while officially discouraging them; and trying
to minimize its role in family life at a time when families are at their
VI
most dependent and the state's presence maximizes their dependence. The
compromise is fraught with tensions and emphasizes the relatedness of the
abortion controversy to other political issues, though it seems as well
to hold the most promise for defusing the controversy and for suggesting
the dimensions of other political conflicts.
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CHAPTER I
REASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR ABORTION LAWS
In January 1973, when the Supreme Court legalized most abortions,
those who had worked for just such legalization assumed that the Justices'
support also signalled broad acceptance of the new law. Most pro-
abortionists continue to hold this position publicly, though there are
good reasons for doubting that most Americans do indeed support abortion
on demand.
Judith Blake, a demographer at the University of California, has been
conducting research on American beliefs about abortion for over a decade.
She is arguing that although a majority of Americans do support abortion
in some instances, most Americans do not support abortion on demand
(abortion at the discretion of the mother or her doctor)
.
Blake argues that the major Supreme Court decisions on abortion
(Roe V. Wade and Doe v. Bolton) are not all representative of public
beliefs. Since 1952, it is true, there have been s\±)Stantial increases in
the number of Americans who say they would support abortions when the life
of the mother was endangered, and (to a lesser extent) when there is like-
lihood of the child being born seriously deformed. It is true that in
1974 almost half the white population questioned in a Gallop Poll responded
that they would condone a woman's aborting an offspring she could not
1
afford to rear.
But what is most striking and most revealing about Blake's efforts is
the fact that only about 37% of those polled in 1974 supported abortion on
1
demand. Most respondents made it clear that they supported the availa-
bility of abortion in very limited circumstances. What is more, those
with the lowest levels of income and education were least likely to support
abortion for the reason that no more children are desired. Only 26% of
those polled who had grade school educations or less favored abortion for
this reason.
It is important to note, too, that men and women with the lowest
levels of income and education were the most likely to consider the fetus
a person at conception, although nearly half the respondents held this
view
.
Also, as late as 1975, 61% of those polled did not believe that
a woman should be allowed to have an abortion without the consent of her
spouse
.
Blake's findings suggest that liberal ass\amptions about widespread
support for current abortion laws are open to question. The strong
probability that prominent pro-abortionists have misinterpreted the
strength and location of their supporters is important to explore because
many public policies are predicated on the assumption that most of the
populace supports the liberal reforms. And this has created a "tilt"
toward or preference for abortion as a means of coping with unwanted and
problematic pregnancies.
Most insurance companies, for example, will reimburse unmarried
women for termination of their pregnancies, but offer them no maternity
coverage
.
Some leaders in the movement for abortion on demand have argued
that abortion has the potential for trimming substantially the budget
3of the welfare state as it is less costly by far to subsidize abortions
for the poor than it is to rear their children for eighteen years.
^
Although this cost-benefit approach does not seem to be explicit
policy, many black leaders have complained about the pressure put on
black welfare recipients by their social workers not to carry their
pregnancies to term. In some instances, social workers threatened to
withhold welfare checks if the women did not go along with the abortions.^
There is also pressure on those who perform, or who are able poten-
tially to perform, abortions. The Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, for example, currently is investigating charges by applicants
to medical schools that admissions officers are refusing to accept appli-
cants who "stated refusal to participate in abortion and/or sterilization
4
procedures."
To date, several medical schools have acknowledged frankly that
this is their policy. In such an intensely competitive situation as
trying to gain admittance to an American medical school, it is difficult
not to view the right to perform abortions as the obligation to perform
them.
This move from "right" to "obligation" is evident too in the advice
columns of most newspapers, where many present letters from women
pressured into abortions they did not really want. Linda Bird Franke , in
her book The Ambivalence of Abortion , quotes Carol Downer, director of
the Feminist Women's Health Center in Los Angeles:
It's gotten to the point in some metropolitan communities
that if you get pregnant, then you have an abortion. It's
that simple. And if you don't have the abortion, then there
must be something wrong with you. You must really have some
sort of complex. And so most women go ahead and have them.
Franke's book is filled with women, who, indeed, "went ahead and had
them" despite the fact that they were ambivalent about or even opposed to
the action. The pressure, by spouses, boyfriends, parents, was strong;
and most found it difficult to find support for their desires to complete
their pregnancies. Most still seemed very unsettled about their abortions.
Some continued to grieve for the children they aborted.
In a society where the impression is that abortion is almost
universally accepted as a method of dealing with unplanned pregnancies;
when that method has the additional qualities of being relatively quick,
safe, and inexpensive; and when the alternatives to abortion (financial
insecurity, the experience of being an unwed mother) are not modified to
make child-rearing more of a choice, it is understandable that many women
see abortion as their only real option for troublesome pregnancies.
But if the impression of overwhelming support for abortion is false,
there is a substantial reason to re-think the American experience,
particularly, to re-examine the commonly held liberal assumptions about
the sources of opposition to our abortion laws. Blake's work in partic-
ular puts considerable pressure on pro-abortionists who assume that
opposition to liberal abortion laws is generated for the most part by
6
right-wing Catholics and vengeful men.
But once doubt is cast on the premier assumption of most pro-
abortionists that elective abortion is widely supported, their position
as a whole deteriorates. The remaining assimiptions (concerning the rights
of the mother over her child, the oppositions' hatred of women, for
example) are dependent, in large part, on broad support for their legi-
timacy. If we cannot accept the popularized version of pro-abortionism,
5we must identify who the anti-abortionists actually are and explore the
beliefs which support their position.
In Chapter Two, I shall explore working class anti-abortionism.
I have limited my explorations primarily to this group, because they are
the most opposed to elective abortion, yet the least publicized. The
actions of working class people have also been severely misinterpreted
by most pro-abortionists, and these misinterpretations are likely to
cause these people deep injury. Finally, I have focused on these people
because the working class way of life suggests the limits of liberalism
more clearly than others do.
In this chapter, I shall try to deepen and extend the work begun
by Judith Blake on anti-abortionism and the working class. For Blake
argues that, as with the population control policies, most liberals and
feminists have based their assiamptions about the needs and desires of
working class people on false assumptions. They have assumed, for example,
that poor and working class parents want fewer children than they have; •
have been unable to procure and use contraceptives effectively; would
welcome the opportunity to abort; and (in the case of women) would prefer
7
career opportunities other than motherhood.
Blake's findings are that working class and poor families have in
the past and continue to want larger families than do middle and upper
class parents. She finds, too, that those who wish to limit their family
sizes have been able to obtain and use contraceptives effectively.
Blake argues that efforts by government agencies to encourage family
planning among these classes have met with some hostility as many members
resent and feel threatened by being so often the targets of government
efforts at population control.
Blake argues that for these people, family roles are the most
significant of those they play. They see themselves first as parents,
spouses, sons and daughters. Husbands work hard at dead-end jobs to
ensure the financial security of their families. Wives resist the lure
of more exciting careers to ensure that the children are raised strictly.
Even time is usually marked by the pregnancies, births, weddings and
deaths of family members.
It is rational for such people to want to maintain the importance of
these roles given the paucity of alternatives. And public policies which
put pressure on these roles are likely to be resisted by those at whom
they are aimed.
For the working class particularly, abortion as a method of birth
control poses a clear threat to family life. Its easy availability and
the fact that many policymakers seem to prefer it as a method for dealing
with unexpected pregnancies makes abortion a particular threat to those
who are dependent or potentially dependent upon the state.
This threat to the ideal of working class family life is exacerbated
by the fact that the overwhelming number of women who obtain abortions
are unmarried and have no other children. Thus abortion is considered
a means of preventing or eliminating family life. Also, the working class
ideal of family life appears to be threatened by the Supreme Court's
decision that neither the spouse nor (in the case of an unmarried minor)
the parents must be consulted when a pregnant woman wants an abortion.
. Many of the ideas and beliefs which have dominated the abortion
controversy reflect middle and upper class assumptions about work and
family life which working class people do not share. Peter Skerry argues.
for example, that middle class and upper class men are more likely to
have challenging careers which frequently take them away from family
concerns; that these men are more likely to think of themselves, to eval-
uate themselves, in terms of their occupational success or failure; and
that their careers are more likely to spill over into their "family
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time . "
These men are more likely than working class counterparts to have
severed or loosened ties with relatives, as their professional success
is often contingent upon their willingness to relocate. Their wives are
more likely to have the educational background, leisure and financial
resources to explore careers other than child-rearing. Their children
are more likely to spend their leisure time outside the home and immediate
neighborhood. The family unit has less of an exclusive claim on the
physical and emotional resources of its members.
This is in sharp contrast to the situation of working class men
for whom the family has become an important escape from what is often
a routine and undignified work life. The family, if anything, has
increased in significance for these men. Children are reared in tight
rein
.
On one level, I shall argue, the abortion controversy is as heated
as it is because it crystalizes a conflict of ways of life and because
that conflict has not yet been fully, or even substantially, understood.
In the third chapter, I shall set out the popular version of pro-
abortionism to suggest ways in which it is based on misinterpretations of
the working class way of life; and to suggest other basic problems with
the position which could, if confronted, suggest possibilities for
compromise with the anti-abortionists.
On another level, the abortion controversy suggests the poverty of
the liberalism which spawned most pro-abortionism. In Chapter Four I
shall focus on two prominent pro-abortionists - Judith Harvis Thompson
and Garrett Hardin - to show how their pro-abortionism has an implicit
side which can undermine the attainment of the liberal vision which
inspires them. The implicit side requires the traditional social arrange-
ments which their explicit social programs disturb. It is unrecognized
in part because of their claims to political neutrality and, in part
because their liberalism encourages an abstract individualist view of
the world which cannot capture important aspects of social life.
On one level, the abortion controversy is impelled by misinterpre-
tations and on another by a vision which is only partially understood.
In my concluding chapter, I shall explore the prospects for
resolving the controversy. I shall argue that there is an abstract
case to be made for the morally informed political compromise, and that
in important ways, there is such a case to be made for our abortion
controversy. Although such a compromise would not be the ideal most
participants would prefer, there are grounds for a compromise and some
reason to expect that each side could, on reflection, acknowledge at
least the minimal amount of legitimacy to each way of life which would
promote a spirit of compromise.
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CHAPTER II
ANTI-ABORTIONISM AND THE WORKING CLASS
IDEAL OF FAMILY LIFE - AN INTERPRETATION
^- The Interpretive Method - A Defense and Explanation
In this chapter, I shall offer an interpretation of working class
anti-abortionism. My analysis is intended, in part, as an instantiation
of the interpretive method of social inquiry. My research on working
class women is based, in substantial part, upon dialogues I have had with
them, the dialogue being the appropriate method for the interpretive mode.
But since the appropriateness of particular models of explanation is wide-
ly contested in the social sciences, my choice of the interpretive method
requires some defense.
The goal of strict behavioral science is to construct a science of
man equal to the presumed objectivity of the natural sciences. Such a
science would include a range of concepts which would be used by any
trained observer to explain human behavior. Its proponents assume that
human action can be captured in such an objective vocabulary. But the
model explanation has been criticized from many perspectives.
Thomas Kuhn, for example, argues in The Structure of Scientific
Explanation that even the natural sciences cannot lay claim to the
neutrality its proponents claim for the behavioral sciences. Natural
scientists work within paradigms which establish the parameters of
research, indeed, what is to count as a fact."'"
The critics of the behavioral method in the social sciences argue
that social reality is not objective, as many behavioralists assume,
10
11
but is shaped, in part, by the ideas and beliefs the participants have of
themselves. And these ideas and beliefs are embedded in social practices,
roles, and institutions.
Peter Winch, in The Idea of A Social Science
, argues that most of
our experiences are possible because we have a vocabulary in which to
express them; and in this respect most of our experiences would be
impossible outside social life. The emotions of love, grief, trust,
resentment, for example, presuppose the existence of others who under-
stand the intentions and beliefs which are embedded in those concepts and
who are capable, therefore, of responding at the level suggested by those
intentions and beliefs.
Some of our experiences, moreover, are possible only within a
particular form of life. A participant in an exchange of goods could not
characterize herself as having accrued a "profit" if she were not a par-
ticipant in a form of life which marked this distinction and the corres-
ponding ones of a capitalist economy. Neither could a shepherd of old
have characterized himself as a "conspicuous consumer" nor his sheep a
"bad investment." The form of life in which he was implicated lacked
such vocabulary, hence the possibility for him to identify himself and
his sheep in this way: the ideas and beliefs appropriate to these charac-
terizations were not available for the having.
On this view, social explanation must begin with an understanding
of the ideas and beliefs which the participants have of themselves, for,
to repeat, it is these which constitute an important part of what they
are. This understanding precludes the type of objectivity required by
strict behaviorists because the observer must, to some extent at least.
12
immerse herself in the way of life and identify with it. It is
unavoidable
.
Now, it may be that the self-understandings of the participants,
even if they are understood perfectly by the observer, will be distorted
or incomplete. The social scientist, after understanding the ideas and
beliefs of the participants in a way of life, might offer an interpre-
tation of it which is at odds with that which the participants them-
selves would give.
Though the social scientist is building on the self-understandings
of those whose actions she is trying to explain, when she goes beyond
these, she is relying, implicitly, or explicitly, on a philosophical
anthropology, a theory of man to support her interpretation. The
philosophical anthropology is built into the explanatory framework and
cannot be severed from it. It is because of the partial self-constitution
of social reality and the absolute dependence of social explanation on a
philosophical anthropology which cannot be proven objectively, "that
neutrality cannot be a goal of the social sciences.
For as Charles Taylor argues in Interpretation and the Sciences of
Man, social explanation is reflexive . The social scientist argues that
men are brutish, nasty and selfish, for example, and this interpretation
helps to shape her beliefs about others and, probably, their response to
her. The speculation helps to shape social reality.
It is the reflexive nature of social explanation which is responsible
for the "hermeneutical circle" characteristic of interpretive social
science. Interpreters are engaged in "readings" of social ideas, beliefs,
meanings, and if the readings are not acceptable to other social
13
scientists, the explanation of social action will not make sense either.
The only recourse in this predicament is to try to persuade those who do
not "see" with more readings. There is nowhere else the argument can go;
though Taylor insists that working within the interpretive circle, it is
not inappropriate to ask social scientists to "change themselves," which
is precisely what seems necessary if we are to come to grips with social
theories at odds with our own.
There is here no "knock-down" evidence which will prove a theory
true and which will be acceptable to all involved in the enterprise.
All explanations, all interpretations, are subject to claims of "distorted
consciousness" by those who have different readings of social meanings.
Some of the implications which flow from this model of social expla-
nation are unnerving; and I suspect that this has encouraged many social
scientists to doubt that there are any reasons for choosing one theore-
tical framework over another. But there are some tests which can help
establish the validity of an explanation. We can be legitimately
suspicious of an explanation, for example, which is built on a view of
human relationships which the explainee, in her ordinary life, rejects.
And we can be suspicious of explanations of social life which the
participants, on reflection, reject as inadequate characterizations
of their social life. But our clearest explanations will always be
those which give us some perspective; hence our most profound social
explanations will be historical explanations.
14
2. Interpreting Working Class Anti-abortionism
The dialogue form is the most appropriate mode for interpreting a
way of life. Ideally, it can help the interpreter understand a way of
life and also accommodate the reflexive nature of interpretation, by
allowing both the interpreter and the participants to change the direction
of the discourse when, perhaps, the dialogue suggests new understandings
for everyone involved.
For my research, I began speaking with women suggested to me by
women with whom I work (at a part-time position in a supermarket) . These
women, in turn, suggested others who might be interested in speaking with
me. In all, I spoke with twelve women.
In each instance, I spoke with the women in their own homes, held
two conversations with each, for a total of about 5 hours spent talking
with each woman. In every instance, I was treated hospitably and invited
to lunch; and in every instance, I accepted. The conversations were
recorded on tape - a fact which made the women self-conscious only for
a few minutes
.
I have tried to show the inner rationality of the working class way
of life, so that I can build upon it to suggest how it has been misin-
terpreted by pro-abortionists; how it is at odds with important aspects
of liberal society; and how liberalism ultimately is dependent for its
success on aspects of working class life.
The validity of my interpretation is dependent, in part, on the
extent to which it explains better than others have, the reasons for
working class anti-abortionism. And the validity is established, in
part, by the compatibility of my interpretation with other evidence we
15
have about the working class way of life.
I consider the project important for two reasons. First, as I have
already suggested, there is recent evidence which suggests that most
members of the working class are opposed to abortion on demand."^ The
^^^-i^P3l--??.y°P ..•^^'--'-^ conducted by Judith Blake during the last decade
revealed that 70% of those with grade school education (51% of those
with high school educations) , and 62% of those living on incomes of
$7,000 or less, were opposed to legalization of abortion during any
time after conception.^
This contrasts sharply with the beliefs of those with college
educations, of whom 87% approved of legalization of first trimester
abortions. Of those with incomes of $20,000, or more, 62% approved.
Education and income levels seem to offer the greatest indication
of beliefs about abortion on demand, the personhood of the fetus, and
the rights of all involved in the decision to abort. Even religious
beliefs, which are most commonly claimed to be the determinant of
beliefs about abortion, are not so revealing as are the educational and
income levels of the respondents. The beliefs of Catholics and
Protestants, for example, were about the same with respect to beliefs
about legalization of abortion when the mother has been raped, when her
health is endangered by the fetus, when the fetus might be born with a
congenital defect, when there is no desire to have another child, and
6
when the mother believes she cannot afford to rear another child.
There is, then, suggestive evidence that the abortion controversy
may harbor a class conflict. This possibility, though, has been
largely unexplored.
16
The leaders of the Right-to-Li fe movement, for example, assume that
their support comes from those who wish to protect the lives of the unbor:
Their interpretation of their increasing strength does not generally
include the possibility that there may be other reasons why supporters
might oppose liberal abortion laws.
And most feminists and family planners assume either that working
class people support abortion on demand, or that the broad opposition to
abortion which did exist is vanishing as members come to see that their
beliefs about strict abortion laws were irrational.
These positions by the principal participants in the abortion con-
troversy have encouraged a closing-out of consideration of working class
opposition to abortion on demand. And the second reason for my pursuing
another interpretation of working class anti-abortionism is to suggest
that such a closing-out increased, perhaps unwittingly, the burdens the
members of this class already carry.
In this chapter, I shall build on the recent evidence of working
class opposition to abortion, interpreting and filling out what such
research only suggests exists.
My interpretation is based on several sources. The first is recent
interpretations of working class life, particularly Lillian Rubin's
Worlds of Pain and Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb's The Hidden
Injuries of Class . These studies suggest that while there has been a
significant democratization of the American way of life, substantial
inequalities remain which encourage different ways of life, indeed,
different self-understandings among members of different classes.
17
My second source is the set of in depth conversations I had with
working class women. My purpose in conducting these conversations was
to substantiate and bolster the work of Rubin, Sennett, and Cobb and
to delve specifically into beliefs about abortion. My final source is
my own experience with working class people, which comes from a part-
time job I hold in a supermarket, the neighborhood I live in currently,
and my own background as a member of a working class family in a working
class community.
I shall draw on and elaborate upon these sources to show that
working class opposition to abortion can be understood best by seeing
how these beliefs are connected to others which celebrate family life,
generational ties, respect for life. These beliefs reflect a set of
commitments, often not articulated, which underpin an ideal way of life
and a particular self-understanding and self-dignity.
These beliefs and commitments distinguish members of this class
from members of other classes, where we cannot expect to find different
ideals of family, work, neighborhood life.
What is more, the actual upholding of this shared ideal within the
class itself differs - a circumstance which can help explain both the
intensity of working class opposition to abortion and the fact that some
working class women do have abortions.
For the ideal of nurturance and self-sacrifice for the extended
family is held by most working class people and it is against this ideal
that members assess their conduct and measure their self-esteem.
In my own research, the coherence between the ideal and the actual
conduct of the working class women with whom I spoke seemed to be quite
18
high. They believed, for example, that they had certain obligations to
their elderly parents, and, indeed, they did take their parents in with
them when they could no longer fend for themselves
.
I suspect that such a strong coherence can be attributed, sub-
stantially, to several circumstances. The families I was involved with
were firmly rooted in specific neighborhoods and communities; they had
no plans or pressing reasons (such as lack of jobs) to move elsewhere.
This lack of mobility produced a stability which seemed to facilitate
the logistics of caring for extended family members. It encouraged, as
well, a great degree of predictability about relationships and expecta-
tions. Members could know with reasonable certainty, for example, who
would be out of work when, who would be responsible for the care of
certain aunts and uncles, etc.
All of the families with whom I was involved had strong ethnic
traditions and religious commitments to draw on which were compatible
with the working class ideal of family life. All of these circumstances
promote a broad identification with special commitments and obligations
to the extended family as well as the impetus to fulfill them.
It seems clear, though, that even though most working class people
do identify with these obligations and commitments, not all of them live
up to them. In 1976, for example, there was one divorce for every two
7
marriages. The divorce rate has increased by 127% from 1962-1976.
And the working class people are just as likely to divorce as are
8
members of other classes.
The United States Children's Bureau estimates that between 50,000
and 75,000 incidents of child abuse occur in the United States every
19
year.^ This, too, seems to cut across class lines. ''"^
I shall suggest that though the ideal of working class family life
is embraced and defended by a majority of members, not all members live
up to the obligations and commitments which are the basis of this ideal.
With respect to abortion, liberal abortion laws are perceived by
most members of this class as a threat to the ideal itself. And because
the ideal and the self-identification with it are linked so intimately,
liberal abortion laws also threaten the self-identity of most working
class people.
We can expect members of this class who both hold and largely live
up to the ideal of family life to oppose such laws. And I want to argue
that we can also expect strong opposition from members of this class who
identify with the ideal but who do not always, or even largely, live up
to the obligations and commitments which are its basis. Indeed, some-
times their public celebration of the ideal and public opposition to
abortion is stronger than other members of their class. Their sense
of self is just as, if not more, threatened by liberal abortion laws
than the others
.
Finally, there are those members of the working class who do not
oppose liberal abortion laws - those, I would suggest, for whom the
ideal of family life has no or little meaning. Though recent evidence
suggests that this group is a small minority, it does exist. I shall
suggest that the circumstances which promote identification with the
ideal of working class family life others share are missing or diminishing
for these people, thus lessening the likelihood that an attack on the
ideal would prove a strong response from them.
20
I hope, then, to deepen recent interpretations of working class
anti-abortionism first, by illuminating the way the working class
ideal of family life is threatened by liberal abortion laws; second, by
suggesting that opponents of abortion include those members of the class
who identify with the ideal, though they do not necessarily uphold it
privately (thus explaining why members of this class divorce, abuse
family members, get abortions, while publicly, often vociferously
rejecting all of these) ; and third, to suggest that where conditions
compatible with this ideal are eroding, we can expect working class
people to lean more in support of liberal abortion laws than they would
in more nurturing circumstances.
I shall begin, then with a consideration of the ideal of working
class life.
The importance of the family to members of the working class is
evident in almost every aspect of working class experience. Consider
this account of a typical day of one of the women with whom I held
several conversations:
I get up around 6:30 and make breakfast for me and Wade
(her husband) . I get Brandy (her daughter) up and get
her dressed. We drop her off at my mother's or at one of
my sisters' and then we go to work. After work, we
usually pick up some groceries and then we get Brandy.
We might stay awhile and talk. Then, I make supper while
Wade and Brandy watch T.V.
After dinner, I clean up, maybe do some housework, watch
some T.V. until Brandy settles down. Or maybe my father
comes for a visit or we go to see him and my mother.
If I don't work. Brandy sleeps a little longer, I do more
housework; maybe I go to my mother's to do the wash. Some-
times, we'll go some place on Sunday; or sometimes there's
time for one of my projects; but mostly this is what we do.
Nothing special.
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It is very common for working class people to live close to their
parents and other relatives. Often, they live within the same house or
on the same street; almost always they live in the same town.
And it is generally the extended family that provides its members
with most of their social contacts. Members generally visit one another
frequently, exchange news, discuss- family problems, perhaps watch tele-
vision or play cards together. Extended family members generally act
as babysitters for one another for infrequent nights out, or, more
usually, when the mother must work.
In my research and experience, it was not at all unusual to find
mothers and married daughters and sisters who regularly shopped together
for food, clothing, appliances. Neither was it uncommon to find members
borrowing money, food, clothes, cars, or tools from one another.
Most accounts of typical days are filled with activities shared
with or accomplished for extended family members. There are calls to
mothers and sisters; errands run with or for other family members; visits
with ailing or elderly parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles. So, too,
the primary concerns are family concerns: a sister's shaky marriage,
a brother's trouble with the police, a husband's desire for a more
organized household.
Says Lillian Rubin:
Generally, it is the relationships with extended family -
parents, and siblings - that are at the heart of working
class social life... These are the people who are seen most
often and most regularly, whose lives are shared both
emotionally and socially. These are the people with whom
intimacies are maintained - who can be trusted with the
care of young children on the rare occasion when a couple
takes an evening out alone, perhaps to celebrate a birth-
day or an anniversary.-'--'-
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Working class men and women might have friends with whom they talk
at work, neighbors with whom they keep up occasionally, or (particularly
for the women) old friends they call or visit once in a while. For the
most part, though, the bulk of their leisure time is spent at home, with
spouse and children, or with members of the extended family.
How has the extended family come to play such an important role in
working life - a role apparently it does not play for members of other
classes? Lillian Rubin argues that the family has a different, increased
significance for working class people because the institutions which
generally compete with it for self-absorption are fairly closed off to
members of this class. The most dramatic example of this is the insti-
tution of work.
A typical working class job requires little skill and training, is
highly insecure and tedious. Challenge, skill and companionship are
minimal. In short, the job requires and generally receives very little
absorption of the worker. It is unusual to find a worker who identifies
with his job in the way a professional would. Instead, the meaningful
aspect of such working lives are found outside the place of work. Says
one of the workers Sennett and Cobb interviewed: "...the job's just
cash to live; the things that matter every day to me are at home... the
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family, people in the neighborhood."
The family becomes a retreat for working class men. Says one of
my co-workers: "My family and my work life are like two different worlds,
I come home; I shut the door; I'm with my kids. I live for them."
working class men turn to the family for the sense of dignity and
purpose difficult to find in their work lives.
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Sennett and Cobb argue that the primary source of self-respect for
most workers is the "ideology of sacrifice" members make for their
families. They argue that those at the bottom of the job ladder, in
a society which professes equality of opportunity as a goal, must either
acknowledge that this goal has not been reached and they are its victims,
or recognize that they deserve their bottom-rung position because the
system is working and they are its least able or motivated members.
There is strong evidence to suggest that the system is not working
as conceived. Inequalities in income, for example, have not leveled
13
off in the last few decades. There is a connection between income
level and occupation which illuminates other inequalities. Those in
professional and white collar occupations are more likely than those in
blue collar jobs to receive benefits in addition to salary.
They are apt to have more comprehensive health insurance, sick pay
and disability benefits; they are likely to have more liberal vacation
benefits, increased job security and retirement funds. Also, there is
generally more job responsibility and autonomy in salaried occupations.
And finally, there is a tight connection between the income level
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of one's parents and one's educational progress.
Such inequalities intertwine and encourage stability in the system.
Thus, working class children are likely to have the same or similar goals
and ways of life as their parents.
Sennett and Cobb argue that while many of the working class men
they interviewed acknowledged in the abstract that the system of
equality of opportunity is not working fairly, most, on a personal
level, blame themselves for their fate. Their low-level positions
are
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experienced as personal failures rather than public injustices.
Nearly every worker with whom Sennett and Cobb spoke said at some
point: "If only I had what it takes, things would have been different.""'"^
Or,
Look, I know it's nobody's fault but mine that I got
stuck here where I am, I mean... if I wasn't such a
dumb shit... no, it ain't that neither... if I'd applied
myself, I know I got it in me to be different, can't
say anyone did it to me.-'-^
Or,
I really didn't have it upstairs to do satisfying work,
if you know that I mean... I just wasn't smart enough
to avoid hauling garbage . ''^
These workers salvage, or shape, a sense of self-respect from their
jobs by viewing their labor as a sacrifice made for their families. Work
has meaning because it is being done for others, for the family, so that
they can have the homes, vacations, financial security a husband and
father is supposed to provide.
The self-respect flows from the fact that the working class man
considers his sacrifice freely chosen. He has made a choice to
sacrifice his energy, time, perhaps his good health, for his family.
What is more, without his sacrifice, the members of his family could not
maintain dignity themselves . They would be forced to collect welfare,
a humiliating experience for most working class people.
The ideology of sacrifice extends well beyond the provision of the
family's material needs. Working class fathers also speak of sacri-
ficing their free time for their kids, so they'll "learn the right
values." For most men, working tedious jobs with plenty of overtime
makes spending leisure time with their children an enormous sacrifice.
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Usually, the ideology extends to one's parents and one's parents-
in-law, particularly when these folks grow older. Although most working
class children could not afford to institutionalize their aging parents
even if they wished this, most would never consider doing so. The
belief that one is responsible for one's family members is a commitment
deeply rooted in working class life, one which is emphasized and made
more freely chosen by the ideology of sacrifice.
This sense of familial obligation apparently is not so strong in
members of the other classes. Lillian Rubin found the difference quite
striking. When asked to fantasize about what they'd do if they
inherited one million dollars, 34% of the working class people she inter-
viewed said they would help members of their extended families, while only
one professional said this - and he was the only professional interviewed
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from a working class background.
Rubin speculates that members of the other classes do not need
usually to consider the financial well-being of their parents, as their
parents are generally financially secure. Indeed, they often help out
their children. But this explanation risks the assumption that if only
working class children had such resources, they would, say, institution-
alize their parents when they were no longer capable of living alone.
But when this subject came up with some of the working class women
with whom I spoke, their responses were, in general: "I could never do
that. I could never put my parents in a nursing home. They belong with
us. They'd be so hurt if we put them in a place like that. And, after
all, children are supposed to take care of their parents, right?"
The belief that one's parents belong with other family members is
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much like the belief I heard stated many times that one's children did
not belong in nursery school. "I don't want strangers looking out for
my kids. Besides, I mean, unless they're really desperate for money, and
she has no family, the wife should be able to take care of the kids
herself." These commitments to maintain the closeness of the family
usually require some sacrificing by the members. Consider two accounts
that came up in some of my conversations.
In the first, the woman's father had died over a year before. One
of the woman's sisters immediately moved in with the widowed mother,
bringing along her own husband and three children. Another sister
bought the first home in the mother's neighborhood that became available,
honoring the mother's wish to stay put. All of the woman's children
live in the same town and take turns running errands for her, keeping
her company and assisting her through her period of grief.
There was no hesitation, apparently, by any family members about
making such arrangements, though this is a drain on all of them, I am
told.
In another family, the grandmother "visits" each of her four
children a few weeks at a time. She has long since sold her house.
Her visits are an emotional and physical drain on the families as the
woman is unable to get around much by herself and is disoriented
occasionally. She eats heartily, is enormous in size, and generally
breaks the slats on the bed she sleeps in. There is no consideration by
any of her children to institutionalize the woman, even though she is
eligible, through welfare, for some such care.
Such gentle treatment of their aged members comes, as it were.
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naturally, to many working class families. The relationships in the
family are built on loyalty to members (to almost all extents)
; gentle
and personal treatment of the elderly and dependent; stability in
marriage, exclusive care and rearing of the children.
This does not mean that these obligations are never experienced as
burdensome, or even as posing extreme hardships upon family members. By
and large, though, these obligations are accepted without question, if
not without complaint, about burdens which they often impose.
Neither does this mean that no one is ever mistreated in a working
class family. Instances of child, spouse, and parent abuse are
increasing, and the abuse does not seem to be class-specific.
The important point is that such treatment of the elderly and
other members of the extended family is part of the ideal by which most
working class people assess their conduct. It is something with which
they strongly identify, and would defend publicly, even though, for
various reasons, not all members are always or even largely living up to
the obligations and commitments inherent in the ideal.
Joseph Howell, in Hard Living on Clay Street , argues that there are
at least two types of working class families: the "hard" and the
"settled" livers. The "settled" families are those who not only identify
with the image of family life as close-knit and demanding but also, for
the most part, live up to requirements of this ideal. The "hard" livers
are those who, though they strongly identify with the image and can be
expected to defend the way of life to others, do not actually abide by
its requirements. Howell suggests that members of both types can be
considered members of the same class, though their differences emphasize
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that there are tensions within the class itself."""^
Lillian Rubin, too, noted in her analysis of a working class
community that many of the couples she interviewed had an ideal of
family life before them which they used to evaluate their own actions.
She suggests that not all of the couples with whom she spoke seemed to
be living up to the image, though they were careful to present themselves
as though they were, and to fend off any challenges she would make to
the image itself.
It is likely, then, that even though most working class people
identify with a vision of family life which exacts long-term commit-
ments and sacrifice from its members, not all members will actually, for
various reasons, live up to those commitments. The important point is
that their self- identifications with the roles, expectations, the entire
way of life, are so firmly rooted, that threats to the image of family
life, whether or not all members are actually faithful to it, are likely
to be firmly challenged . The potential loss of bearings, loss of self, i
just as, if not more, threatening to those members of the working class
who cling to but do not always uphold the image of family life, as it is
to those who largely do.
An in depth understanding of the way of life can help us to under-
stand how some liberal reforms, particularly liberal abortion laws,
threaten the very basis of that way of life. The understanding is
deepened when we see how there are conflicts within the class itself
over those who do and do not live up to shared expectations, and when
we see how the self-identifications, nevertheless, are shared by most,
though not all members.
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Now the ideology of sacrifice, to continue to flesh out the ideal,
is assumed, almost exclusively, for the benefit of family members. It is
assumed, moreover, not only by the male breadwinner, but by all family
members
.
The wife is supposed to make do, not complain too much, assume as
much of the extended family obligations as she can. Children are
expected to help out around the house, behave in school and around the
neighborhood, and assist their grandparents when asked.
Underlying the ideology of sacrifices are commitments that help to
keep the extended family intact: hard work, support, willingness to fore-
go immediate pleasure for the needs of others.
These commitments, though, are generally rather tacit, not
implicitly embraced or even realized. This seems evident in the shock
expressed in such statements as: "I could never go on welfare," or
"I could never put my parents (or grandparents) in a place like that,"
or "I could never send my kids to nursery school." It was as if they
were asked, for the first time, to consider the unconsiderable
.
The ideology of sacrifice adds an element of choice to these
commitments, and, most importantly, and as a consequence, a degree of
self-respect to the sacrifices. There are others, after all, who do not
provide for their families; who would put their parents away; who don't
care if their youngsters are properly raised; who complain about their
husbands' abilities as providers. They could do these things too; but
they choose not to be like these others.
Sennett and Cobb argue that the ideology of sacrifice and the self-
respect which flows from it are fragile and threatened from several
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directions. Welfare recipients pose a threat, for example, because they
suggest that the man's family would be provided for even without his
working. Much of the resentment toward welfare programs and the
recipients themselves, which seems to be characteristic of working class
men, may be understood as a defense of the limited measure of self-respect
staying off welfare allows them.
Consider these conversation fragments recorded by Sennett and
Cobb about welfare recipients:
I work for my money. My job is to work for my family.
They don't want to work, they live for nothing but kicks,
nothing but good booze and good sex.
What kills me are these people that are on welfare and
things like that - or like these colored people that are
always squakin'
. Yet they don't wanta work. I go out. I
work sometimes nine, ten days in a row. I got five
children. That's what burns me, when somebody else - like
the woman on the street here that collects welfare. She's
a phony, but she can still collect it. She takes a cab
back and forth and we pay for it.^*^
Most will acknowledge that some recipients of welfare are not frauds
and could not survive without some assistance. They agree, as well, that
they have an obligation to assist these needy with their taxes. Yet
these men would not consider going on welfare themselves. Such an act
would undermine the sacrifice they are making for their families as well
as the dignity which comes from making the sacrifices.
The ideology of sacrifice common to working class men is also
threatened by working class wives who want to go back to work.
According to Lillian Rubin, 58% of working class women work outside
.
.
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the home, most of them in part-time positions.
This often, though certainly not always, poses a threat to their
husbands, because if their wives have to work, it is a signal that the
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men are failing, as least to some extent to provide for their families'
support.
Consider the response of a working class husband Rubin interviewed
on the subject of his wife working.
She just doesn't know how to be a real wife, you know,
feminine and really womanly. She doesn't know how to give
respect because she's too independent. She feels that
she's a working woman and she puts in almost as many hours
as I do and brings home a paycheck, so there's no one
person above the other. She doesn't want there to be a
king in this household.
I'd like to feel like I wear the pants in this family.
Once my decision is made, it should be made and that's it.
She should just carry it out. But it doesn't work that
way around here. Because she's working and making money,
she thinks she can argue back whenever she feels like it.^^
The husband's sacrifice is enhanced when his wife is fully dependent
upon him. It is not automatically undermined if the wife works, partic-
ularly if she works only part-time, draws a small paycheck, and
encourages her spouse to think of her contribution as marginal or as
"pin money." This seems to be the way that most of the women with whom
Rubin and I spoke presented their jobs to their husbands, though most
also admitted that their financial contributions were probably much
more for necessities than luxuries.
The validity of the husband's sacrifice and his self-esteem are
severely threatened, however, when the wife insists that her husband
is as dependent upon her work for his security as he would like her to
be upon his
.
Bennett and Cobb argue that the ideology of sacrifice is also
jeopardized by successful children who move out of the community to
new career opportunities. Fathers find their hard work "rewarded" in
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an unexpected way as the family life which gave their sacrifices meaning
is broken up in the ultimate fulfillment of those sacrifices. Thus, the
unit for which they sacrificed is also undermined by those sacrifices.
In my own experience, I have not found any instances of this. I sus-
pect not that it never occurs, but rather that the opportunities for
escaping a working class life are not so available as Sennett and Cobb
seem to suggest. In my experience, and certainly in Rubin's, most of the
children of working class parents expect to and have departed very little
from their parents' way of life.
Their argument does suggest, though, the intimate connection which
exists between the ideology of sacrifice and the importance of extended
family ties to working class people. For the working class man espe-
cially, his family is his most important resource. It provides companion-
ship, an outlet for tension and, perhaps, for some of his natural talents.
The family, most of all, is a place of solace.
The belief that one is sacrificing for the family legitimizes the
time spent at work in boring, often demanding jobs. His work helps to
keep the family unit intact, to give its members and himself the self-
respect of staying off the welfare rolls.
Since most other avenues for independence and achievement are closed
off to most working class men, the family is enhanced as that institution
through which the young family member can hope to achieve a sense of
purpose and respect.
For, as Lillian Rubin demonstrates, even when there is evident
talent in a working class youngster, it is generally not fostered. Its
fulfillment often becomes the possessor's daydream. And the future is
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not a career and lifestyle commensurate with one's natural abilities, but
one which mirrors their parents' adulthood. They'll most likely marry,
work in jobs similar to their parents, live in the same community, and
rear their children with similar values.
As one of Rubin's respondents said in response to her question:
"When you were little, what did you think you'd like to do when you
grew up?"
I dreamed I wanted to be a policeman, but I just never
followed through with it.
(Rubin: Why was that?)
I really didn't think I was smart enough, I guess I knew
you had to go through three, maybe four years of college.
And I don't know, I just kind of let it go. Even if I
had thought I was smart enough, there was no way I ever
thought about going to college. I guess the really big
dream was just to get out of high school and get a job.
Things were tough at home. I wanted more than anything
else to get some money in my pocket so that I could do
something, have some fun once in a while. Now, I can't
figure out why I thought working was such a big deal.
But how can you know things like that when you're a kid?^-^
Working class girls seem to have a similar lack of clarity about
careers. One of the wives Rubin spoke with said: "I never had any
goals about being anything, except I always figured I'd get married
and have kids, and that would be enough for anybody."^'*
And one of the women with whom I spoke:
In high school, you had to go to the guidance counselor
every year and tell him what you wanted to do when you
got out. Once I told him I wanted to go to college,
once to beauty school, and once, I think, to art school.
The whole thing made me really nervous because you had
to have everything planned out before you went in. But
all he ever did was say 'that's a good thing to do,' I
mean, I didn't get a lot of help. Anyhow, I figured
I'd get married and not have to worry.
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And for most working class youngsters, marriage and child-rearing,
which most often mean the same thing, are the ways to establish inde-
pendence from parents and grandparents. Young men get jobs and marry;
young women marry and have children. That is how most working class men
and women enter adulthood.
Family roles, family models, and family traditions provide members
with a purpose for their labor and a rather solid self-identity. They
are roles and ways of living which are not without their joys as well as
pains; and they are ways which are not always embraced with great enthu-
siasm. But the extended family experience is accepted by most members
and is the most important source of self-respect they have.
As with their spouses, working class wives are family-oriented
people. For most, the family roles of wife and mother are the only
adult roles open to them. The women I spoke with, for instance, were
not encouraged by parents and school authorities to embark on careers
even when they showed talent. Said one:
I never liked school. I didn't do well; I still can't
spell. I am embarrassed by this, especially when I
have to fill out forms. I never write letters. I found
I had some talent in art, but my guidance counselor told
me art is a hobby, not a job.
This woman eloped early in her senior year in high school.
Another woman told me: "At nineteen, when I got married, I thought
marriage was the greatest way out." And married life has been fulfilling,
at least in some ways, for these women. For them, married life is the
only life worth living as an adult. They cannot imagine going through
life alone, without spouses, children, all the relatives that an estab-
lished marriage brings with it.
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A spouse is the person to whom a woman can always turn when things
go wrong at work, or with the children, or with other family members.
Married life symbolizes adulthood and also the stability and community
most of them say they want.
Children are viewed as the natural outcome of marriage, indeed,
and especially for women, one of the central reasons for marriage.
Children are important even though they often create pressures in the
marriage. They are a drain on the family budget; and the same tight
budget allows their parents few opportunities to take some time away
from them.
But even though family roles are primary ones for most working
class women, all of those with whom I spoke said that, had they to do
it over again, they would wait a few years longer before getting married
They said either that they would work a little longer, or try to launch
a career, or perhaps, go to college.
But (and this came, invariably, in some form from every woman)
I am not a woman's libber. I would get married, I could
never go through life alone. I need my family, my husband,
my kids. I need them for support, I guess. For me, marriage
is not what I thought it was when I first got married, but it's
the best relationship for me.
"Besides," most would continue, "who are they kidding? I work part
time and I'm exhausted. You can't tell me I could have a career, plus
raise the kids, plus be the dream wife and housekeeper you see in these
magazines .
"
Women's Liberation is conceived of as a movement which either puts
unrealistic demands upon women or forces them to break family bonds.
If women are to have careers (magazine stories to the contrary) someone
else must assume the major responsibility of rearing the children, or
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else childrearing must be postponed or rejected altogether.
What is more, a liberated woman, at least through these women's
eyes, must be totally independent, most especially from her husband.
It is a picture of womanhood most working class women have difficulty
even imagining. There seems to be no place, at least in the popular
conceptions of women's liberation movement, for the type of relationships
most characteristic of working class family life; relationships of
dependence, sometimes subordination, of long-term and extended commit-
ments. It is not surprising that, as one woman said, "I just can't see
myself in a life like that."
The image of the liberated woman is a threatening family image,
as well as a foreign one, because as popularly expressed, it is a dis-
paragement of those without career ambitions, of those women who are
content to be housewives, and of those who sometimes bolster their
husband's self-esteem at the expense of their own. Feminists who fail
to understand the importance of the family to working class women, most
especially how it is the institution which gives them their greatest
sense of self, risk alienating most of this large group.
This near-blanket rejection of the women's liberation movement does
not necessarily mean that working class women find no fault with their
current way of life. Lillian Rubin found many instances of depression
and anxiety in women she interviewed. Many women were discouraged at
the lack of communication in their marriage; at the ambiguous sexual
roles their husbands wished them to play; at the dull routine of keeping
house and rearing the children; at the lack of help from their spouses.
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But these arrangements are familiar and acceptable nevertheless,
particularly when compared with the feminist alternative.
In sum, there are many pressures which encourage working class men
and women to marry and form a particular way of life. The way of life,
nevertheless, is generally acceptable to most, and provides its members
with a sense of self and of self-respect. The roles, commitments,
expectations which are characteristic of working class family life
provide most of its members with their strongest identity.
This is not to say, again,- that all members who identify with
the roles, etc., actually fulfill the expectations inherent in them.
For many reasons, including the possibility that other sources of self-
identification are not readily available to most members of this class,
some working class people do not actually live up to the obligations and
commitments characteristic of the working class ideal.
Most of the people from whom this background was drawn seemed to
be members of "settled" working class families, though there are hints
which suggest otherwise. Again, I suspect that this is largely
attributable to the fact that the family way of life in these instances
was supported by lack of mobility and ethnic and religious traditions
compatible with and supportive of this way of life.
The setting out of the main features of this way of life, even if
not all members fully or even largely adhere to its principles, helps
us to see how greatly it shapes the ideas and beliefs, indeed the self-
understanding of its participants. The understanding should help us
see why abortion on demand is such a great threat to most members of
this class. I shall turn, now, to an elaboration of this.
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When Lillian Rubin was discussing a working class woman's early
marriage (precipitated by pregnancy) with her, she asked the woman if
she had ever considered having an abortion. The woman responded.
Never, I could never do that. God, I remember how
terrified I was. I kept thinking it couldn't be true,
I remember even thinking that I would take my mom's
car and drive it off a cliff. I knew he'd marry me.
I never doubted that. But I didn't want to get married
.
I wanted to do things and to have things. 2
5
Says Rubin, "Not one person, woman or man, even considered abortion -
generally not because of religious scruples, but because the idea, they
said, was 'disgusting,' 'not a choice'; or because it 'just never
.
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occurred to them.'"
Rubin theorizes that these beliefs about abortion are encouraged
by two circumstances. First, she believes that beliefs about abortion
were more restrictive prior to 1973, because abortion was illegal in
most circumstances then. All of the women with whom she spoke had their
"problem" pregnancies prior to 1973; the other children born to the
remaining men and women were born well before then also.
Rubin argues that their current beliefs are most likely attributed
to the fact that abortions were illegal during their reproductive years.
She expects these men and women to change their beliefs as abortion on
demand becomes more acceptable; and younger working class men and women
accept it more readily.
Rubin argues that the other reason the people she interviewed were
so opposed to abortion even though the pregnancy occurred out of wed-
lock, was because the pregnancies were allowed to occur, however uncon-
sciously, so the couple could marry and assume adult status in their
respective families. For, as one of the men Rubin interviewed said.
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"If a girl got pregnant, you married her. There wasn't no choice. "^"^
In my own conversations with working class women, some of whom
were pregnant when they married (and most of whom could have obtained
a legal abortion)
,
I did not find the more enthusiastic embrace of
liberalized abortion laws which Rubin anticipated. I suspect that, in
this instance at least, Rubin does not make the connection between
abortion and the obligations and commitments which sustain working
class family life.
In my conversations, I did find an unwillingness to acknowledge
that all abortions were always wrong, and that women who have abortions
were always making an immoral decision. Typical of conversations I had
are these:
I could never have an abortion. No, it's not for me. Why?
I think it's a person. Having had a baby, I don't see how
you make a decision that now it's a person and now it's not.
It's a person from the very beginning - at least to me it
is. When I was carrying Brandy, that's the way I thought
of it.
Now, that's just for me, and that's just in normal circum-
stances. If I had gotten measles or something, and the
doctor said for sure I'd have a retarded child, I'd have to
think for a long time, about having it. Probably we would,
but, well, that's awfully hard.
My friend, Mandy
,
got pregnant just about four months ago,
and she had an abortion. She said it was because she
couldn't afford to redecorate her apartment and have another
baby. I don't know if that's really why, but if it is, I
think that's wrong. I could never do that.
Would you ever join the Right-to-Life movement or a similar anti-abortion
group?
I don't think so. I'm not what you'd call political.
I don't belong to any political groups. I usually don't
even know when elections are. I just vote the way my
husband tells me to.
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Abortion is personal, I think. In my family, you just
don't have one. It's a baby from the very beginning, and
everyone loves it way before it is born. No one would
forgive you, I think, if you aborted it. You try to plan
it so you can at least half-way afford a new baby; but if
it happens by mistake, you'll manage somehow.
And another:
When I found I was pregnant with Janice, I told David and
he was thrilled. We got married right away. We never
thought about abortion. We both think it's a person and
that it would be wrong to kill it like that.
In some ways, I have more confidence in myself because I
had the baby. My parents practically disowned me; I was
bored at home; and marriage wasn't what it was cracked up
to be. But I made it.
When Janice was born, I didn't love her. It's still hard
for me to admit, but I didn't. I had to give up so much
for her, I resented her a lot. One of my friends was
pregnant when she got married and she felt the same way
about her baby. We were so relieved to find out, we
both started to cry. I mean, it's not that we hated the
babies or anything. But carrying them was lonely and
humiliating.
Did you ever consider abortion?
No. Maybe because it was illegal, but I doubt it. We
could have found someone to do it. We just felt that
we had to take responsibility for what we did. I mean
how could we kill a baby because we got caught. It
wasn't her fault after all. No. We never really con-
sidered not having her. If I did have an abortion, I
wouldn't have told anyone. Even now, I'd keep it a
secret. I ' d be too ashamed to let my family know.
In the conversations I had, abortion was always discussed as a
procedure of desperation , and one which none of the women would consider
for themselves. Every woman I spoke with gave the primary reason for
her opposition to abortion on demand that to her and her spouse and
family, the fetus was a person, and it's wrong to kill persons without
good reason. Most could not come up with any good reasons except that
if the health of the mother were endangered or there was "proof
positive'
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that the fetus would be born retarded.
Every woman went on to elaborate, once she stated her belief in
the early personhood of the fetus, about how close she had felt to the
developing fetus during each of her pregnancies. Most spoke of having
prepared names for the babies well before they were born, and of the
various emotional reactions of each of the relatives. Clearly, each
baby was "part of the family" well before it was delivered.
None of the women considered abortion a matter they would decide
upon alone. When I asked each of them if they would include their
spouses in a decision to abort or not, most them reacted with a shocked,
" Of course I would. Why wouldn't I? I mean, he's half of it. He has
to support it and everything, right? It's just as much his as it is mine,
right?"
A few of the women said they knew of women who had abortions, but
most did not know anyone who had. These suspected that if any of their
relatives or close friends had had an abortion, they would have kept the
fact very confidential. For abortion was definitely an unacceptable
method for dealing with a pregnancy, however, unwanted.
None of the women with whom I spoke was in any way involved in the
public debate about abortion, though all of them were strongly opposed to
family members taking advantage of liberal abortion laws. Some of the
women were concerned that liberal laws were encouraging women to end
pregnancies they might otherwise have come to accept and carry to term.
Most expressed concern that their own daughters would be tempted by
such laws to abort unplanned pregnancies, though none could condone such
action. They planned to help their daughters deal with their fertility
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by giving them contraceptive information when they thought they needed
it. All of the women insisted upon the distinction between contracep-
tion and abortion. They would tell their sons and daughters that while
"in this day and age" they should know about methods of birth control,
they should never think the family would condone an abortion by any of
its members.
For the women I interviewed, liberal abortion laws, though generally
tolerated, also seemed to threaten them.
The direct threat was, of course, that their daughters would be
tempted into an abortion they could have performed with such ease. Such
an act would be a challenge both to the parents and the values of sacri-
fice and respect they sought to encourage in their children. The
indirect threat of liberal abortion laws was, as some implied, that
their very existence challenged the commitments which sustain working
class family life. In general, though, most of the discussion about
abortion was a discussion of why it would have been impossible for the
women themselves and their spouses to have considered having one.
For the women with whom I spoke, childbearing and childrearing were
the most fulfilling activities in their lives. Most looked back to their
pregnancies with great delight. "I felt very special when I was
carrying my children. Everyone was always helping me and was very
excited planning for the new baby. And I enjoyed having the babies inside
me, guessing what they'd be like when they got older."
Even the woman who was depressed about her first, "accidental"
pregnancy, spoke glowingly of her second.
Their pregnancies did not disturb careers, but began them. They
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situated the married couple more firmly in the extended family with
childrearing and bearing experiences to share, with clothes and furni-
ture to be loaned to or borrowed from other family members.
Now I suspect that most of the women with whom I spoke would not
have an abortion themselves. The systems of family supports, of ethnic
traditions and religious commitments seem strong enough in most
instances that the women would carry an unexpected pregnancy to term.
But there are hints, even from these women, that perhaps they would not
live up to the ideal (of respect for life) they publicly support.
Consider, for example, the woman who said that even if she had an
abortion, she would not tell anyone ; or the statements of every woman with
whom I spoke that if someone they knew did have an abortion, most likely
no one else would ever find out about it.
Consider, too, the words of one of the women Linda Bird Franke inter-
viewed in the waiting room of an abortion clinic. The woman was
waiting for her daughter to have an abortion:
I was brought up to believe that intercourse was a sin
before you are married, and I believed it and I still do.
So, according to the Bible she has sinned. I think you
are supposed to be married. That's the way I feel about
it. And I told her that, but I guess she didn't pay no
mind. We are church-going people and I take her there
every Sunday. But I didn't talk to the preacher about it .
Only her sisters and her brother and my mother know about
it I told her it's murder to have an abortion. ^8
Clearly, the commitment to respect the fetus is shared by all of
these women. It is an essential ingredient of their identity that they
consider themselves and are considered by others to be gentle, reliable,
self-sacrificing women.
It would be too simple, moreover, to conclude that working class
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women who publicly oppose abortion but have them anyway, or working
class men who publicly embrace family life but abuse their children,
are irrational or deceitful.
Surely, this is sometimes the cause. But, a deeper explanation of
the inconsistencies, I suggest, would first recognize the intimate
connection which exists between the roles and expectations of the
working class ideal of family life and their self-identifications. Then
the explanation would recognize that the stability of this way of life
is to an important extent contingent upon circumstances (lack of
mobility, strong ethnic ties) which are increasingly difficult to
maintain; and, finally, that other sources of self-identification are
rare
.
We can expect that most working class people who largely live up
to the obligations and commitments inherent in their way of life to
oppose liberal abortion laws because they threaten the family exper-
ience and values which shape their self-identity. We can also expect
that members who share this self-identification, but who privately do
not always live up to the ideal, will oppose such laws, perhaps even
more vigorously than the others.
There are, then, at least two levels to working class anti-
abortionism. They are linked by a common source of identity: the
family way of life I have set out. The loss of this identity would,
I suspect, be just as acute for those on both levels.
It seems likely that there is another level to working class life
which includes members who are not opposed to abortion. Judith Blake's
evidence suggests, for example, that while most working class people
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are opposed to abortion, not all are.
I suspect that these members are much less likely to identify
with the form of family life most characteristic of working class life.
The neighborhood ties, stability, extended and close kinship ties,
strong ethnic and religious traditions have eroded in some areas of the
country, I suspect, and the obligations and commitments, including
those which encourage opposition to liberal abortion laws, have less
support. We can expect in such circumstances that these members will
be much less likely to identify themselves primarily with the tradi-
tional way of family life and to defend that way of life against
outside threats.
There are then, probably at least three levels within the working
class itself with respect to the issue of abortion. And we can expect
that the more closely members identify with the ideal of family life,
whether or not they always, privately live up to the ideal, the more
vociferous will be their opposition to liberal abortion laws.
Now, most feminists do not make this connection between self-
identification and the ideal of family life. This encourages them to
misinterpret opposition to liberal abortion laws.
The reasons most feminists give for supporting liberal abortion
laws, for example, do not seem to pertain to working class women.
Long-established or labored for careers will not be disturbed by an
unexpected pregnancy. On the contrary, it is through childbearing that
most working class women "come into their own" as women.
Also, most of these women consider the fetus a person from very
early on, generally well before the third month of pregnancy. The
relationship between the working class mother and her fetus - a relation-
ship of mutual dependence, of nurturance - may be thought of as a
paradigm of working class family relationships. Most feminists do not
speak of a relationship between the mother and fetus, preferring to
consider both separate entities. What would be thought of as a minor
surgical procedure (the abortion) by most feminists, would be a loss and
a murder to most working class women.
Finally, building upon this, the fetus is not thought of by the
working class woman as an individual with rights against her and
other individuals with whom it happens to be involved. Family life
is based, rather, upon a system of loyalties, obligations, trust,
commitments, which preclude treating members solely as individuals with
rights against one another.
Husbands and wives, their children, parents, and relatives are
bound together in a unit which is rooted in mutual dependence and
respect for all members. The respect extends to the dead in the family
as well as to those not yet born into it. It is common to hear that
"your grandfather would want you to do this if he were alive today," or
"I visit aunt so-and-so because my mother always did; and she would be
hurt if everyone forgot her old aunt." The present is shaped both by
the past and the future.
Most of the women with whom I spoke mentioned that they are con-
cerned that such respect for others and for our natural resources is
diminishing. One woman, the most strongly opposed to liberal abortion
laws, said that she felt tremendously "uncomfortable" about the effect
such laws were "really having" on American women. "It probably seems
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all right now, with all this women's lib and all; but I keep thinking
that all of this wasting of life will catch up with us. I worry about
it. "
Said another woman: "I'm trying to get my kids to see how valuable
everything is, to learn to make do. They're pretty spoiled in a lot of
ways; but if they have to, if we have a depression, I know they'll be
able to survive. I don't want them to get the idea that it's okay to
be wasteful."
Every woman with whom I spoke had a vegetable garden in which she
took great pride and delight. Said one: "I love to take care of this
garden; it makes me feel good to think I helped make what we're having
for supper. Besides, it helps out."
This respect for natural resources and concern about waste is
compatible with the other concerns of working class family life. Indeed,
it would be surprising to learn that members did not have such a con-
cern for the immediate environment.
In the same way, the opposition to most instances of abortion is
"compatible" with, indeed, required by, the way of life most working
class people share. The opposition, at least for one's own members,
accords with the values of respect and sacrifices for all members
(including those not yet born) at the root of the family life. The
opposition flows from a form of life shaped by a particular view of
the past and future; of appropriate roles for all members; of standards
of excellence, of respect, of worthiness.
The beliefs that members have about one another and about themselves
help to constitute that way of life and their self-understandings.
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These connections between self-interpretations, identity, and the beliefs
which help to shape a way of life, emphasize the danger of trying to
settle a controversy like abortion in abstraction from particular ways
of life.
The purpose of this chapter was to suggest that working class anti-
abortionism can be understood most fruitfully by understanding the way
of life from which the beliefs flow. It is above all a family-centered
ideal. Other institutions, such as work and politics (and with the
possible exception of the Church) do not vie with the family for the
personal and extensive commitments of its members.
The family, ideally, is the place where members find solace from
the pressures and boredom of work: a place where, through marriage
and starting a family of one's own, the status of adulthood is con-
ferred; where members can find identity and purpose.
My interpretation of this way of life is an attempt to show that
working class anti-abortionism "makes sense," is "rational" when under-
stood from within the way of life itself. The standards which encourage
and enable such a form of life necessitates opposition to most forms of
abortion
.
We do not have to argue, that all members of working class families
do live up to the ideal. Recent child abuse and divorce statistics reveal
that this is not so. It is, perhaps, more revealing to show that most
working class people identify with the way of life, that the identifi-
cation is primary, and that even though not all privately meet the obli-
gations of the way of life, they can be expected nevertheless to oppose
laws which threaten it.
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Now, if, as I assume, anti-abortionism is intrinsic to this way of
life, and if the way of life is prized or at least accepted by most of
its members, there is a compelling reason to include these people as
participants in the debate about liberal abortion laws.
Such laws threaten the values of respect for the fetus, of
sacrifice for the family, of responsibility for all life one has
created. Understanding the anti-abortionism in this light opens up
several issues, not now discussed in the controversy which I shall
explore in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
POPULARIZED PRO-ABORTIONISM - A MINIMAL CRITIQUE
1
.
The Abortion Decisions
In its 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court rejected
Texas' claim that life begins at conception and that the state has the
right, therefore, to protect such life by prohibiting abortion except
to save the life of the mother. It rejected that claim, first, on
the grounds that
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins. When those trained in the respectable discipline
of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive
at any consensus, the judiciary at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.
^
And second,
In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been
reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recog-
nize it, begins before birth or to accord legal right to
the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and
except when the rights are contingent upon live birth.
^
The Court concluded that the state does have a compelling interest in
protecting potential human life, but only at viability, "because then
the fetus has the capacity of meaningful life outside the mother's
3
womb .
"
And in Doe v. Bolton, the other 1973 abortion decision, the Court
found unconstitutional some of Georgia's abortion regulations because
they were not reasonably related to health of the mother.
These decisions, legalizing abortion on demand, were both the
best and the worst possible decisions. They were the best for the
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pro-abortionists because they were viewed as a humane, pi±ilic and legal
response to the problems of women's oppression, family instability,
poverty and over-population. They were the worst for the country as
a whole because they signalled to the pro-abortionists the end of the
need to debate further the implications of liberal abortion laws. This
withdrawal from public discourse has encouraged a deterioration of pub-
lic debate and a weakening of the liberal position itself.
The possibilities for compromise, moreover, are dependent in part
upon a resumption of debate, with particular emphasis on the status of
the fetus, the use of abortion as a contraceptive of first resort, and
the real intentions of those participants in the abortion controversy.
The 1973 decisions have resulted in great public access (particularly
through the media) to arguments for abortion and very little to anti-
abortionist positions. What is more, the pro-abortionist positions
have been the subject of very little critique.
In this chapter, I shall explore the popularized version of pro-
abortionism, particularly the characterization of most anti-abortionists
as mean-spirited, religious males. I shall argue that this characteri-
zation is not only inaccurate, but also has the effect of pushing to
the Right many working class anti-abortionists who would rather not
make that move, and of diminishing the possibilities for compromise.
I shall elucidate the pro-abortionist position and offer a minimal
critique of it. In the following chapter, I use the work of two
prominent pro-abortionists to suggest that the popularized version of
pro-abortionism is not only counter-productive, but also helps to
undermine the very liberalism it explicitly celebrates.
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2. Popularized Pro-abortionism
There are several key features of the popularized version which I
shall examine in turn. The first is the argument that abortion on demand
is the keystone to women's freedom.
According to most feminist writers, reproductive freedom is the
key to achieving other freedoms. And the right to abortion on demand,
as the guarantor of reproductive freedom, is the keystone to achieving
equality, freedom, fulfillment for all women.
Gloria Steinem says, for instance, that:
If we can't have power over our bodies from the skin in,
how can we have power over our bodies from the skin out?...
the demand for reproductive freedom, as an inalienable
human right, has become the bottom line for women through-
out the world. And abortion, as the contraceptive means
of last resort becomes the crucial battleground.
Never again can political leaders be allowed to call
themselves friends of women, no matter what their posi-
tions are on other issues, unless they also support
reproductive freedom on a basic human right. Our freedom
and equality depend on it.*^
And Lawrence Lader:
For Women's Liberation, abortion became the great cata-
lyst. Whether they aimed at moderate goals like job
equality, or the complete dissolution of the nuclear
family, the feminists quickly learned that all of their
progress depended on a woman's control of her own body
and fertility. The ultimate freedom remains the right
of every woman to legalized abortion.
And Betty Freidan
:
...we have come to recognize that there is no freedom,
no equality, no full human dignity and personhood
possible for women until we have control over our own
bodies .
^
There are three reasons generally acknowledged for the importance
of reproductive freedom to women's freedom in general.
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First, there is the claim that a woman cannot be free if she does
not have full control over her physical activity. This control is assumed
to be basic, essential - a natural right of women. According to this
claim, the state has no legitimate right to regulate what a woman can
and cannot do with her own body. This claim is usually not argued, though
it underpins most feminist arguments for elective abortion laws
. And
the right of women to control their own bodies is generally interpreted
narrowly as the right to control their reproductive capacities.
The assumption that there can be no freedom for women until there
is reproductive freedom is dependent upon the second claim. This is
that reproduction narrows a woman's possibilities for developing fully
all her talents. Reproduction can be burdensome, it is argued, because
women are also the child-rearers , and childrearing itself is for the
most part "narrow" and "degrading." Continuous and/or exclusive
childrearing, it is claimed, discourages women from developing other
. .
7
capacities.
The implicit assumption here is that every woman has talents to
develop which are not exhausted by producing and raising her offspring;
and that each woman is unfulfilled, unfree, to the extent that she is
unable to explore these capacities.
A second aspect of the popularized version of pro-abortionism is
the claim that women's reproductive systems have been and sometimes con-
tinue to be controlled by men to further their male interests and to
inhibit women's development. There are several theories about why this
has occurred.
Wendall Waters suggests, for instance, that abortion is denied
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most women as a method of family planning because of "demographic
aggression" of male political, religious, and economic leaders. This
occurs even though the denial promotes serious physical, economic, and
psychological problems for the women who bear unwanted children, and
for the children themselves. Says Waters, "The feminists are perfectly
correct when they declare that if men had to bear babies, compulsory
gpregnancy laws would have disappeared long ago."
Waters suggests that the desires of male leaders for domination in
their spheres have overwhelmed their senses of compassion for the burdens
most women face when they bear children. He argues that these men have
used their positions or power to force women to reproduce and that, until
recently, women have been unable to respond.
Gloria Steinem and Garrett Hardin's claims are compatible with those
of Water's. Steinem argues that since women's bodies are "society's most
basic means of production," women's freedom to choose abortion is the
freedom "most likely to be resisted by the patriarchal structures,
regardless of their interest in population control or even in saving
money." She continues:
We produce the workers and the soldiers of the patriarchy
and controlling our reproductive processes is the sole way
that the growth and identity of a race or religion or nation
can be assured (which is why the most racist societies -
Hitler's Germany, for instance - have been the most opposed
. to abortion or other decision-making by women.
^
And Garrett Hardin claims that the most important reason for
opposition is that laws opposing abortion were made by men. Men, never
having experienced the suffering of motherhood, not to mention the
suffering of unwanted motherhood, are willing to allow women to
experience this adversity. Hardin claims, in Mandatory Motherhood, that
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if men were the ones to bear children, there would be no abortion laws."'"^
Other feminists suggest that opposition to abortion is part of a
fear in men that women would threaten their power positions as they
develop the talents which were untapped while they reared their offspring.
Evelyn Reed, for example, has argued that the opposition by the
Catholic Hierarchy is motivated by a desire to control women lest they
challenge the power of its members:
By opposing and seeking to overthrow the Supreme Court
decision (Roe v. Wade) the Catholic hierarchy is striving
to keep all women in the same status as animal females who
are subjected by nature to uncontrolled procreation. They
are determined to continue to rob women of their basic
human right - the right to control.''""'"
This, according to Reed, is because the hierarchy is concerned that
if
women gain control over their bodies , they will forthwith
proceed to fight for full control over their minds and
lives. ^2
A third aspect of the pro-abortionist argument is that working class
people, particularly working class women, are opposed to abortion because
they mistakenly assume that the consequences of a decline of traditional
families (presumably hastened by elective abortion) would be disastrous
for them. For the traditional family, in this version, is a miniature
of the patriarchal system and is perpetuated by the manipulations of male
political, religious, and economic leaders to the detriment of working
class people.
Alan Hunter and Linda Gordon argue that the leaders of the New
Right play on the fears of working class people that without the
traditional family compassion and solace from the work world will be
nowhere to be found. The New Right leaders intentionally
obscure the
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way the family oppresses women and encourages men to think of their
futures as unchangeable."'"^
Andrea Dworkin also argues that women on the Right like Ruth Carter
Stapleton and Anita Bryant (now repentant) manipulate family symbols
and encourage women to continue to play their traditional roles (par-
ticularly procreative roles) even though this type family victimizes
14
women
.
The popularized version of pro-abortionism also suggests that most,
if not all, anti-abortionists are not ignorant of the consequences anti-
abortionism has for some men and all women; they are, rather, vicious,
insensitive and unreasonable. The gist of the argument is that since
elective abortion is so overwhelmingly popular, those who oppose it must
also oppose the spirit of democratic rule and the humane objectives of
elective abortion.
Karen Mulhauser, Executive Director of the National Abortion Rights
Action League (NARAL), says,
With fanatical zeal, and backed by hundreds of thousands
of dollars, the so-called 'right to life' forces have made
maior advances in their current attack of those women least
able to defend themselves: the poor.-^-'
A recent NARAL newsletter suggested that those who oppose abortion
on demand are "repressive," "antichoice , " and "inhiJinane" in allowing
unwanted children to be born.
To these claims is often added the charge of insincerity: that
those who oppose abortion on demand on the grounds that the fetus is
a person with the right to live also support capital punishment and
16
did support the war in Viet Nam.
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Garrett Hardin suggests that those who insist that unwanted or
possibly defective infants to be born do so "because it is easy to bear
the adversity of another." Gloria Steinem likens societies without
1
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liberal abortion laws to Hitler's Germany.
Samuel Bair, in his book Abortion: A Woman's Choice
,
says that
there are three groups of people who oppose liberal abortion laws. The
first group includes those who are opposed on religious grounds. This
group, he insists, is a very tiny minority whose views, moreover, should
not be considered in a democracy (where Church and State properly
separate)
.
The second group includes those who "cannot identify with
a woman in distress." Finally, there are those who "visualize elevating
18
their personal moral stature before others and themselves."
Bair concludes that the totality of all three groups is a small
minority, though members are well-financed and vociferous.
Bair also states that
The real problems of an unwanted pregnancy for someone
who can barely support an existing family have never
interested the opponents of abortion .. .Beneath the clamoring
righteousness, there is a silent iceberg of suffering, and
the anti-abortionists prove their lack of respect for the
tragedies they cause. -'-^
Laura Shapiro, a feminist writer, in Mother Jones , shares Bair's
assumptions about the inhumanity of most anti-abortionists. She
characterizes the abortion opposition as coming from "fanatics" and
^ T
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those who have brought abortionists to trial "manic and vengeful.
In the growing body of literature promoting liberal abortion laws,
there is little, if any, sympathy extended those who oppose the laws.
With the exception of passing mention of those who consider the fetus
a person, most pro-abortionists writing on the subject charge that anti-
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abortionists are motivated by a contempt for those who suffer because
their pregnancies are unwanted.
Finally, the popularized version of pro-abortionism insists that the
fetus's right to life is far surpassed by the harm that inevitably would
come to it, its mother, and the rest of society by virtue of its being
unwanted
.
Some of the assumptions which support this goal are first, that it
is the poor who are most disadvantaged by unwanted pregnancies. Already
financially strapped, additional offspring only exacerbate an already
difficult way of life. For these people, abortion would be the great
equalizer:
Prior to the liberalization of New York's abortion law, the
total fertility rate of blacks was 2.85, as compared to 2.15
for whites... In the course of just 18 months, the ... rate of
blacks fell to 2.11, the replacement level, while white fer-
tility declined much more modestly to 1.84... The evidence is
compelling that... by enabling blacks to avert what must have
been a considerable number of unwanted births, and thereby
reproduce at a rate more compatible with the well-being of
the family unit, abortion legalization may rank as one of the
• 2
1
greatest social equalizers of our time.
Second, it is assiamed that elective abortion would spare unwanted
offspring the less than fulfilling life which seems to be their lot. The
evidence, universally cited here, is a Swedish study which compared two
hundred and twenty boys and girls born in 1961-1963 to women who were
denied legal abortions twice during the same pregnancy, with an equal
number of children whose mothers did not request abortions. The
researchers concluded that those children whose mothers had been declined
abortions suffered "higher incidence of illness and hospitalization...
slightly poorer school marks and performance (and) a somewhat worse
.,22
integration in the peer group.
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Third, abortion is assumed to spare the mother psychological and
emotional trauma.
In sum, the popularized version of pro-abortionism is: that an
overwhelming majority of Americans support a woman's right to choose
abortion; that the bearing and rearing of children drains women of their
natural talents; that conservative anti-abortion laws originated in
attempts by men to suppress women, and their liberalization signals an
end to oppression; that some in the higher echelons of religious,
economic, and political power continue to manipulate working class people
into supporting the destructive conservative laws despite the harm it
does them; that aside from the manipulated, those who continue to sup-
port conservative laws are inhumane, power-hungry, well-heeled fanatics;
and finally, that the physical and emotional harm incurred by the mother,
child and rest of society by an unwanted pregnancy carried to term far
surpasses the right of the fetus to be born alive.
3. A Minimal Critique of Pro-Abortionism
There is a minimal critique of this position which I shall offer now
and which I shall build upon in the next chapter.
The assumption that a substantial majority of Americans supports
abortion on demand appears, as I have already suggested, more and more
dubious. While there is unquestionably wide support for some forms of
abortion, the beliefs of most Americans are full of nuance and limitations
not taken into account by most pro-abortionists. But given the importance
of this claim to their case, we should expect some serious attention
given to its documentation. We have special reason to expect
documenta-
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tion given to their claims that the new support for abortion on demand is
due, in large part, to a recent major change in men's beliefs about women.
But there is, by and large, little attention paid to the massive changes
in ideas and beliefs which must have occurred very recently for there
to be widespread support for elective abortion laws.
One of the only writers who tries to account for it is Lawrence Lader,
who says that prior to 1968, "the most puzzling issue in the revolt
against abortion laws (was) why women suffered quietly for so long.
A leaden apathy suffocated all protest, even though birth control had
reached respectability by 1935 and other nations had completely legalized
23
abortion .
"
Lader 's account of the abortion movements during the late 1960 's is
focused, for the most part, on those women who "came out" for abortion
when they joined the Women's Liberation Movement. He argues that these
women, especially feminist leaders like Germaine Greer, realized that the
key to all liberation was a woman's right to control her own body and that
this must include the right to elective abortion. Lader argues that these
women educated other women to these facts and "mobilized them from their
apathy .
"
But Lader 's account is limited by its focus on these feminist leaders,
He does not explain how these women generated support from men and women
not involved in or even opposed to the feminist cause. Lader is surely
aware of these people, and that they are substantial numbers, as he
documents many instances where feminist pro-abortion activities were dis-
rupted by large numbers of male and female opponents.
Garrett Hardin suggests that male leaders finally realized that
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without elective abortion, the earth's "carrying" or survival capacity
24
would be threatened seriously.
For the most part, though, the question of change is not explored.
Most writers merely assume that beliefs changed, and changed radically,
that male leaders from all spheres, and members of the general public,
changed their minds about elective abortion. And that the reproductive
freedom implied by elective abortion will encourage a reformulation of
the goals of our patriarchal system, promoting full self-realization for
women
.
These accounts surely lose some of their explanatory power by not
having explored the enormous changes which must have occurred. We are
left with the conclusion that, for some reason or reasons, men who
previously wanted only to exploit women, now do not. And women who
could be manipulated into thinking that such exploitation was in their
best interests, came to a "true consciousness" - all sometime during the
years 1968-1972, when public opinion allegedly shifted overwhelmingly to
support abortion on demand.
The across-the-board inattention given to reasons for supposed
changes most people underwent about liberal abortion laws is important
not only because of the lack of plausibility it gives most pro-abortionist
accounts, but also because those accounts are used commonly to legitimate
assumptions and beliefs about the alleged minority which still opposed
elective abortion.
A second reason for criticism is the fact that most of the women
having abortions are using no form of contraception. Every estimate
of
which I am aware suggests that most women having abortions, at
least 90%,
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were using no method of contraception whatsoever at the time of conception.
These women were not, for the most part, contraceptively ignorant. Abortion
25
was their chosen method of contraception.
Implicit in the pro-abortionist argument is the assumption that men
and women have contraceptive responsibilities as well as contraceptive
rights. This position is not explicitly argued, though almost without
exception feminists condemn those women who use abortion as a method of
birth control. The implicit assumption that abortion is morally dif-
ferent from mechanical means of contraception, and the explicit assumption
that abortion is an unqualified right has created an ambivalence about
abortion which, if examined, can illuminate some of the weaknesses in the
liberal position.
The demand by feminists that women treat decisions to abort with
moral gravity makes sense only if they assume, on some level, that the
fetus is a person worthy of respect. This implicit assumption of fetal
personhood creates ambivalence about the decision to abort which is
apparently quite common. There is a strain in trying to maintain that
abortion is an unqualified right of women while in practice acting as if
it is a serious decision which should be qualified by a consideration of
the life inside the pregnant woman. This ambivalence extends to the
general reluctance of feminists to accept and condone the practical,
logical implications of some of their arguments.
As Paul Ramsey observes, most good arguments for unrestricted abor-
tion are also good arguments for infanticide. Yet, philosophers like
Michael Tooley, who do draw out the abortion arguments to include argu-
ments for infanticide, have few supporters in theory and fewer in
prac-
tice .
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Tooley argues, for example, that the feminist argument that women
have the right to rid themselves of that which is dependent upon them
must also include the breastfed infant (particularly the infant whose
survival depends on breast milk for nourishment)
. In fact, most newborns
are as dependent upon the mother for their survival outside the womb as
they were inside it. So, logically, this argument for abortion should
27include the option of infanticide.
The same is true of the requirement set by many feminists that
abortion can be performed without restriction on the developing fetus
because it has not yet acquired the status of personhood which entitles
it to the right of life. Personhood, for most feminists, is defined as
"self-consciousness .
"
Yet, it is hard to argue, says Tooley, that the newborn baby has
any more self-consciousness than the infant in utero . In fact, it often
takes months for the infant to establish that it is a being independent
of its mother. Yet, only one feminist I have encountered supports infant
cide as a logical implication of feminist abortion arguments (and her
2 8
support is very qualified in practice) . Even Tooley won't condone
the killing of toddlers, though that is certainly compatible with his
requirement of legitimate infanticide.
This weakness in the popularized version of pro-abortionism accen-
tuates aspects of it which can be criticized. First, the failure to
include the implicit assumption of fetal personhood as a premise in the
argument for elective abortion contributes to the public legitimation
of abortion as a method of contraception of first resort and not a pro-
cedure which kills a living being. This legitimation is at odds with
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feminists' insistence that women treat the decision to abort as a moral
decision and the withdrawal of legitimacy could reduce abortions sub-
stantially.
Second, although most pro-abortionists assume, on some level, that
the fetus is a creature worthy of at least grave consideration before it
is killed, the assumption is at odds with the 1973 Supreme Court decisions
which are always used to justify the existence of elective abortion.
These decisions cannot justify even the feminist argument that women
should "agonize" before they abort. The decisions have almost no legal,
medical, philosophical, religious, or scientific supporters, and it is
worth detailing why this is so.
Baruch Brody has argued that while it was the intention of the
Supreme Court to stay neutral about the humanity of the fetus, its
29
decisions assume, in fact, that the early fetus is not human. The
Court's decision that because those trained in the discipline of
theology, philosophy, and medicine were unable to arrive at a consensus
on the status of the unborn fetus, there are no grounds for establishing
personhood, was very weak. Even prominent pro-abortionists have rejected
it.
Bernard Nathanson is the most prominent, perhaps, of the supporters
of elective abortion to reconsider his position and push publicly for more
conservative laws. He, and others like him, have been affected by recent
developments in fetology (fetal development) to which the Court had access,
but which the Justices chose not to include in their decisions.
Those working in the field of fetology have established that within
eighteen days after conception, the fetal heart begins to work. By the
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fortieth day, there is brain activity. By the tenth week, the fetus is
able to move its own arms and legs, and suck its thumb, swallow amniotic
fluid, squint and make a fist. The fetus, from very early on, has most,
if not all, of the capacities which the late fetus and newborn infant
have
.
The Court argued that the state does have some obligations to protect
the "viable" fetus, which it stated came into existence in the twenty-
fourth week of pregnancy. But Brody and Nathanson suggest that there are
at least two major weaknesses in this position. The first is that,
since the fetus which can survive outside the womb is not significantly
different from that which cannot, the Court actually made no contribution
to establish grounds for personhood, and ignored evidence which could have
laid a solid foundation for future decisions.
The second major weakness was in using the concept "viability" at
all. Advances in the field of fetology have suggested for quite some
time that "viability" is a much more fluid concept than these lawmakers
suggest. In the early 1970 's, for example, it was possible to save
routinely a twenty-seven week old (two pound) fetus, while it is not
uncommon now to save fetuses much smaller than two pounds.
The viability of the fetus is much better established in terms of
its weight (in grains) and the availability of resources to save it.
(The same infant may be viable in one location but not in another hospital
in the same city.)
What is more, Nathanson argues that in making their decision about
the viability of the fetus, the Justices used the same evidence as did
the New York Legislature to arrive at the age of twenty-four weeks.
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(In both instances, he says, the decision-makers merely "split the
difference" between Old English Common Law which set viability at
twenty-eight weeks, and the old New York law which set it at twenty
weeks. "^°) The Court's decisions were strictly political compromises
with no moral import. This is surely at odds with the implicit
assumptions of most pro-abortionists.
Finally, the tendency of most pro-abortionists to insinuate that
working class anti-abortionism is a product of ignorance and manipula-
tion, may well contribute toward pushing these people further to the
Right than they would really prefer to go.
The assumption that traditional family forms are totally repressive,
that religious beliefs are superstitious and those who have them are
victims of the powerful, and that religious beliefs, even if accorded
some legitimacy, should not be acted upon in the political sphere, have
done more to push people to the New Right than they have done to push
them to the Left.
Anyone who has spent time with working class people would know that
there are, at the very least, some joys to family life, some pleasures in
bearing and rearing children; and that working class women have many ways
to work around spouses that are "paternalistic." And the across-the-board
denigration of religious beliefs and insistence that it cannot be expressed
politically is both ungenerous to human and religious history (to say
the least) and an affront to principles of religious tolerance.
Finally, the tendencies of contemporary liberals, like Dworkin,
Hunter, and Gordon, to accord little or no legitimacy to the New Right
might have the unintentional consequence of encouraging more men and
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women in that direction.
For while these writers understand that the New Right, on one level
at least, appeals to traditional family values, patriotism, the impor-
tance of religious beliefs, they do not entertain the possibility that
these beliefs might well be legitimate, even necessary to a particular
way of life.
This tendency to interpret the New Right as irrational is particularly
evident, as I have argued, in their approach to anti-abortionism. These
liberals characterize it, and its proponents, as inhumane or ignorant,
dismissing the respect for the unborn which most often energizes anti-
abortionists .
Traditional working class people already find little or no institu-
tional support for their beliefs in a society guided by liberal theory
and practice; and policies based on interpretations like Dworkin, Gordon,
and Hunter's are likely to encourage their move to groups which accord
some legitimacy to their beliefs. This occurs, even if on another level,
the New Right is dangerously superficial and insulated.
In the absence of an alternative expression of the beliefs which
support a traditional way of life, and with the realistic expectation
that these beliefs will be misinterpreted and treated with hostility by
contemporary liberals , we can expect more and more working class people
to be attracted to the New Right.
The most promising possibility for countering the dangers of the
Right, as well as the sterility of the abortion debate, lies in liberals
re-engaging in debate some of the beliefs which comprise the working
class way of life.
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. Summary
To sum, then, the 1973 Supreme Court decisions on abortion encouraged
pro-abortionists to cut off debate with anti-abortionists. There are good
reasons for arguing that this may have been premature. The popularized
version of pro-abortionism is subject to criticism which, if confronted,
might suggest areas such as stressing contraceptive responsibility, and
the personhood of the fetus, which could encourage both pro- and anti-
abortionists to compromise.
A more in depth appreciation and critique of the popularized version
of anti-abortionism suggests that the areas for compromise might be
greater than most participants would suspect as one explores the ways
pro-abortionists are implicitly dependent on the traditional family life
their position challenges. I shall concentrate on this in my next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
THE IMPLICIT SIDE OF PRO-ABORTIONISM:
A CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM
There is a liberal vision implicit in most pro-abortion arguments
which is largely unexplored. Examining the vision is important because
the implicit aspects of it are at odds with other, more prominent
features of the vision.
In this chapter, I shall explore this feature of pro-abortionism
by focusing on two prominent pro-abortionists: Judith Jarvis Thompson
and Garrett Hardin. Thompson is a feminist and philosopher at Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology who has written extensive justifications
for the right of women to abortion on demand. Hardin is a biologist who
is widely acknowledged as a defender of abortion rights.
The two complement one another - Thomson focusing on a defense of
individual rights, and Hardin concentrating on the non-personhood of
the fetus (at least in its early states of development) and the demographic
necessity of elective abortion.
I shall argue that both celebrate a vision of liberalism that has
implicit social requirements which escape both and which could undermine
that vision. And I shall argue that both Hardin and Thompson, assuming the
neutrality of the social observer, have, in fact, universalized their own
positions and misinterpreted other ways of life. Finally, I shall
suggest that the implicit side of liberalism could, if acknowledged,
contribute toward the development of a morally informed political com-
promise which would receive broad support.
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1
. Garrett Hardin
Garrett Hardin's arguments for abortion are particularly compelling
to explore because he insists upon what many other feminists and popula-
tion planners only imply. The explicitness of his position enables us to
explore at length an issue which is an increasing embarrassment to pro-
abortionists, particularly population planners. This is the fact that
having argued for so long that all women have the right to reproductive
freedom of choice, they are now suggesting (because the population did not
significantly decrease) that reproductive freedom is more a privilege
than a right.
This dilemma is instructive because it illuminates the way pro-
abortionists, particularly planners, rely on traditional values which
their explicit policies undermine. Let us consider Hardin's arguments
for abortion.
The tone, the stress, of Hardin's arguments for abortion have
shifted dramatically in the last decade as have the tone and stress of
the family and population planning organizations he often represents.
From arguing that women should be allowed to have abortions for their
own well-being and the good of society, Hardin has begun to argue that
women should be forced to have abortions, perhaps be sterilized, when the
population cannot bear any more growth.
Hardin acknowledges that he has made some changes in his "policy
recommendations" because women did not rush to have abortions (when
services for them were made widely available) in numbers great enough
to check the population growth.
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Hardin concludes that women are acting selfishly and that the
state has the right, indeed the duty, to coerce women to act in the
public interest. Hardin is currently working for laws which would force
women to become sterilized after each had had child. He insists
that women undergo the procedure because "divorce and remarriage have
played havoc with assigning responsibility to men. Biology makes women
responsible .
"
Hardin is aware that his policy for sterilization can be thought
of as a limitation of freedom, but he argues that freedom is really
"the recognition of necessity." And it is necessary that women cease
reproducing at the current rate.
The state has a right to make such a policy because it assumes a
significant part of the costs of childrearing and because the chromosomes
given to the child at conception are not merely the parents but are
2
"only part of the community's store."
There are two keys to understanding what encouraged Hardin to move
from a position which, at least implicitly, characterizes women as
irresponsible citizens. The first is his notion of society's "carrying
capacity." The "carrying capacity" is the level in a society at which
the population and resources available to keep it thriving are equal.
Now, according to Hardin, some societies are reckless in their
attempts to equalize resources and those who make use of them. These
societies have stern choices to make: either they can continue in the
current direction, taxing their "carrying capacity" and moving inevitably
toward mass starvation and death; or they can force members to limit
population growth through sterilization, abortion, euthanasia.
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According to Hardin, there is a direct correlation between the
standard of living desired and the nuirODer of people in any particular
society: the higher the desired standard of living, the fewer people
the society will be able to successfully accoiranodate
. "Higher," for
Hardin, in interpreted as higher levels of education, technology,
energy usage, skill differentiation.
Those who try to tamper with the Hardin's law of "carrying
capacity" will be undermined by it. So, for example, those altruists,
who insist upon aiding countries where starvation is a persistent
problem, are only prolonging an inevitable collapse and jeopardizing
their own standards of living. Difficult as it may be for such altru-
ists to swallow, such countries can be helped only by allowing their
least able members to die.
Hardin argues that nature does not tolerate the weak, and intel-
ligent human beings should not either.
It should be clear by now that a belief in the 'sanctity
of life' find no support in Nature, if that belief is
the justification for cherishing the life of each and every
individual human being above all goods. As far as Nature
is concerned, the individual life is cheap, very cheap.
Nature (to continue the personification) seeks to conserve
something much more subtle. It may be that human policy
should be dominated by the concept of the sanctity of
life (though Hardin thinks it would be irrational to act
in this way) but if so, not with the support of biology.-^
Though Hardin's views might not on reflection be embraced by other
population planners, they make explicit assumptions other planners hold
only implicitly. Most planners assiame with Hardin, for example, that
upper class Americans have the highest standard of living in the world,
and that our "carrying capacity" should be one with more of these highly
educated, highly paid, highly consumption-oriented citizens. They
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emphasize curtailing the number and controlling for the quality of
citizenry, rather than scaling down consumption and encouraging other
standards of "the good life."
Hardin and others also assume no connection between hunger and
shortages in other nations and our own abundance, Hardin insists that
Americans have simply been more shrewd and more realistic about devel-
oping a high quality "carrying capacity."
Most family and population planners also assume, with Hardin, that
attempts by the state to shape our "carrying capacity" in specific
directions will place the same burdens on all citizens, since they
assiame that all would benefit equally from higher standards and are
equally disadvantaged when the population grows beyond a certain limit.
These ass\imptions have encouraged planners to assume that most
citizens would be only too willing to do what is necessary to limit
growth and thereby improve the quality of their lives.
These assumptions have encouraged them as well to investigate only
minimally the public response to abortion on demand. Most planners
assume citizens would, of course, support such a policy. Working with
these assxamptions , most family and population planners are beginning to
argue that those who continue to oppose elective abortion laws are acting
irrationally
.
Most planners appear to share Hardin's convictions about America's
ideal "carrying capacity," as well as his assumption that public-spirited,
sensible citizens would embrace elective abortion as the most humane
means for achieving this ideal. Faced with increasing intransigence
on
the part of anti-abortionists, and continued population growth,
many
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planners have joined Hardin in his shift of emphasis away from the
humanity of abortion to its necessity
. And women, once viewed as vic-
tims of male dominance and religious fanaticism are increasingly
viewed as menaces to the well-being of American society.
The second key to understanding this shift is in the apparent con-
tradiction in Hardin's arguments for abortion on demand.
On the one hand, for example, Hardin states that the only one with
any right to make the decision to continue her pregnancy is the preg-
nant woman herself.
No one, I will argue, whether husband, parent, father of
her child, or a representative of the community, should have
the slightest right to deny her. The right to abortion
should be hers and hers alone.
And
,
There should not be the slightest communal concern when
a woman elects to destroy the life of her thousand-of-an-
ounce embryo.^
Hardin justifies his argument by claiming that pregnancy and child-
birth are forms of servitude which eat up "the best years of a woman's
6
life," and that women cannot be forced into slavery in a ^ust society.
On the other hand, Hardin suggests that,
Whatever our personal tastes in sex education for the future,
surely this much is clear: that we must more and more
emphasize the non-right of the individual woman to continue
a pregnancy in utter disregard for the significant persons
in her life: her parents, boyfriend, or her husband, and
even society as a whole, since many of the costs of rearing
and educating a child must be borne by society at large.
These at least she must consider: but above all these she
must consider the interest of the child who will come into
being if she allows the pregnancy to continue.
If the total circumstances are such that the child born at
a particular time and under a particular circumstances will
not receive a fair shake in life, then she should know, she
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should feel in her bones - that she has no right to
continue her pregnancy."^
On the face of it at least, it seems as though Hardin is arguing
both that the mother has an absolute right to decide whether or not to
continue her pregnancy and also that she does not. Hardin's claims can
be clarified, I think, by examining some of the assiamptions only implicit
in his arguments.
Hardin's claims are held together by the implicit assumption that
in every society there is a common good and that after a fashion most
members will recognize what it is and act in accordance with its fulfill-
ment .
With respect to abortion, as I have already suggested, Hardin assumes
that the best society is one in which all children are wanted by their
mothers and by those others burdened with their support. Hardin is fond
of quoting Margaret Sanger: "The first right of every child is to be
wanted, to be desired, to be planned, with an intensity of love that
gives it its title to being." Hardin says, too, that the welfare of the
.
.
8
potential child is the most important criterion in the decision to abort.
Now, consider the hypothetical decision-making process of a pregnant
woman acting on Hardin's assumptions. The woman does not take her preg-
nancy for granted, but considers above all else whether or not the child
is really wanted.
A child that is really wanted , Hardin implies, is when all of those
involved in its future rearing and support are able and willing to give
it all it needs to lead a quality of life. This means that the child
must have a better-than-average chance of being healthy and intelligent,
and must not be a financial, physical, or emotional burden on its parents.
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grandparents, or the state.
In order to make this important decision (and it is hers to make)
the woman must first imagine this young fetus as her future child. She
must envision her life and that of her parents and spouse as it would
probably unfold with this child.
She considers, too, the ability of the state to provide the re-
sources her child will need to lead a "quality" life. She must ask if
there are enough schools, jobs, recreational facilities for this child,
and if they are of good quality.
Presumably, after the pregnant woman has thought through the future
of her fetus with respect to all those largely involved in its care, she
will "feel in her bones" whether or not she should carry it to term.
Let us consider now, at another level, what Hardin assises this
woman will do. He assumes that she will be willing and able to form an
imaginary relationship with her fetus, even more, that she will have
enough affection and respect for it that she would not allow it to be
born unless it had a high probability of sustaining not only her love and
regard but also those of its immediate caretakers.
In brief, she must take into careful consideration the probable
future of an unborn child and imagine its probable relationships and
experiences with its future world. She must be capable of forming a
bond, however tenuous, with her unborn child and of assessing its
probable future in the community.
Next, Hardin assumes that the woman has ties with her natural
family and that they have obligations toward her potential child. These
ties, moreover, are sufficiently solid and affectionate that the preg-
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nant woman would be able to judge accurately their willingness and ability
to support this child in the necessary ways. He is assuming here that the
society and the social relationships which characterize it are stable
enough that the mother is able to predict with some certainty the future
of her unborn child.
Finally, Hardin assumes that the potential mother is an intelligent
and loyal citizen. She is capable of judging the state's ability to
care for this particular child. And she is sufficiently dutiful as a
citizen that she can balance her own wishes against those of members of
her society and act in the common good - which may or may not be compatible
with her own particular desires.
Hardin assumes, to sum, that the pregnant woman is able to empa-
thize with others and that she is able to put their collective needs
above her own individual desires, at least in important instances. She
is able to make important moral decisions with a degree of selflessness.
She is able to form bonds with her unborn child and to make a reasonably
accurate assessment of its future.
Hardin assumes, too, that the mother will make the "right" decision
with respect to her fetus. The decision will be so obvious, once she
has reflected sufficiently that she will, says Hardin, "feel it in her
bones .
"
So, when Hardin argues that it is the mother who has the ultimate
and absolute right to decide whether or not to abort, he is assuming that
the decision will be made on the basis of how wanted it is by its future
caretakers and that most pregnant women are qualified to make this
assessment
.
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Most decisions to abort, in Hardin's view, are made to spare the
child an unfair life and its caretakers a burden.
Now, the right to decide is contingent upon, based upon, the assump-
tion that the mother has these qualities of other regard and intelligence,
and that she brings them to bear in her decision to abort. Presumably,
mothers without these qualities do not have the right. This, though,
is only implicit in Hardin's thought.
It is easy to get the impression, at first, that Hardin's theory
of rights is based on individualist principles: the woman, after all,
is granted the right to decide without any interference from others.
But when we explore what Hardin sees as essential to any decision to
abort, we see that he actually assumes that a profoundly social exper-
ience underpins the right to decide.
In Hardin's view, the right to decide is based on the woman's capa-
city and willingness to respond to family and community needs and wants
and to those of her future child, as well as to her own wants and needs.
This is why a woman does not take into account all of these, for-
feits her right to decide in Hardin's view. What is more, we can expect
that should it be in the interests of society, any particular society,
to expand its population, most women would be willing to support the
expansion with decisions not to abort.
Hardin himself does not suggest or explore what social situations,
practices, and institutions, encourage the qualities he assumes most
citizens possess. But we can state that there must be at least a certain
amount of stability in social relationships and a slow rate of social
change if these women are going to be able really to predict their
unborn 's future. There must as well be considerable legitimacy to
the state.
Implicit in Hardin's vision is an ideal of family life where
families are stable, loyal to other members, and rarely disrupted
by changes in traditions and convention; where families are encouraged
to maintain their privacy with the reasonable assurances that they will
rarely be interfered with by the state, whose largest responsibility
is to protect and preserve the way of life.
On the other hand, Hardin is committed to policies which inhibit
the maintenance of that way of life. In The Limits of Altruism
, Hardin
commits himself to policies of equal opportunity, unlimited growth,
unrestrained exploitation of our natural resources, and the widest
9
possible extension of individual rights. And, particularly m his
early defense of abortion, Hardin celebrates the liberal view of family
life which Alan Carlson nicely elaborates.
Carlson argues that in their attempts to be fair, liberals have
allowed "any human relationship involving cohabitation that produces
self-gratification and sexual fulfillment some claim to valid family
status. ""'"^ The concepts of "immorality" or "deviant family behavior"
have no purchase in the explicit liberal agenda.
The liberal agenda celebrates these values for family life:
1. Mutability. There are no constants in moral questions
nor in personal relationships.
2. Choice. There should be no bias towards marriage and
children. Everything is open. All habitual and cul-
tural attitudes may be questioned. All values are on
trial
.
84
3- Experimentation
. Since there are no family or sexual
norms, no traditions worthy of universal emulation, and
no restraints
,
persons must be free to experiment with a
variety of sexual partners and practices to find the
sexual and family lifestyles appropriate for themselves.
4. Self- fulfillment
. Morality demands freedom for people
to realize their own potentials - and their own needs,
desires, and tastes - with a minimum of social rules and
regulations. Relationships should last only so long as
they are mutually self-fulfilling.
5. Uninhibited sexuality . Sexual gratification represents
one of life's ultimate values. Access to regular sexual
gratification should be viewed as a basic human right.
There is no true humanness devoid of sexuality.
5. The problem of children . Sexuality must be viewed as
totally separated from procreation. Parenthood should be
undertaken only after a careful weighing of social, cul-
tural, and economic costs. The burden of social proof
is shifted away from the right of persons to procreate.
Given the problem of overpopulation, reproduction may have
to be viewed as a privilege granted by a government working
towards the goals of decreasing the quantity while increasing
the quality of humankind. Unwanted pregnancies should be
aborted.
At least some aspects of the liberal agenda for the family endorse
ways of life which celebrate individual fulfillment over long-term commit-
ment; immediate pleasure over the sometimes turbulent task of childrearing
abandonment of all norms over the pursuit of a particular ideal.
There are good reasons for arguing that explicit liberal agenda is
incompatible with the maintenance of strong social bonds, loyalty to
other generations and the state, and feelings of affection and concern
for the unborn. The policies which flow from the liberal agenda are
incompatible with, yet dependent upon, traditional social arrangements.
The two undermine one another and suggest the ultimate unattainability
of the larger vision from which they flow. The policy of equal
oppor-
tunity, for example, encourages workers to move to locations
where
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available jobs match their talents - a policy which encourages a
loosening of family and community bonds and obligations (as members,
continually uprooted, are less pressured and less able to participate
in extended family and local community problems)
. Such policies, in
practice, tend to erode the loyalty and capacities for long-term and
affectionate judgment which Hardin implicitly assumes are necessary for
the good liberal citizen.
His commitment to full exploitation of our natural resources, too,
is often at the expense of the predictable day-to-day shape of communi-
ties, and can contribute to dramatic reshaping and impoverishments of
communities as its wealthier members leave to escape the damage which
often accompanies such exploitation.
In the same way, policies which encourage widespread individual
rights can erode the natural bonds of affection between parents and
children, husbands and wives.
George Kateb suggests that liberalism seems to require a "continuous
identity" to function, and yet it undermines the possibility of its
12
attainment
.
Kateb argues that a continuous identity enables citizens to identify
with the experiences of persons who have gone before them and who will
follow them. Such continuous identification encourages those who live
now to preserve and protect the way of life for future generations.
This identity is fostered by slow changes in the way of life, by a
minimum of mobility and by strong kinship ties. The identity is solidi-
fied by beliefs in human uniqueness, beliefs which are nurtured by law
and social policy.
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This sense of uniqueness is being eroded by many liberal programs.
Space exploration has established the seeming immensity of the universe,
which weakens the uniqueness of people on earth. The vastness of modern
warfare, the scale of human and material destruction, coupled with modern
weapons in which the killers never see their victims, encourages a loss
of identification with the experiences of others:
as the reality of human beings as persons grows less
visible - whether to the Pentagon bureaucrat or their
agents - the sense of life as what human beings share
weakens, and a-1 sorts of violence becomes more likely.
Liberal programs which encourage government delivery of services
unwittingly undermine longstanding identities and obligations of neigh-
bors, families, and community organizations who previously assumed respon-
sibility for the provision of basic needs.
So, too, the general expansion of experiences available to people
through technological and psychological investigation has diminished,
rather than enriched, our capacities for self and species - respect by
emphasizing the transitory character of our social and self-identities
and our experiences
.
Many liberal programs assumed to enhance the quality of life diminish
it in practice by disturbing the relatively unchanging features of social
life and practices which make rich social relationships possible in the
first instance. The success of the programs (such as abortion on demand)
is dependent upon the existence of a strong sense of oneself as an
individual member of a community who can make choices which will streng-
then both; but the programs themselves promote social arrangements which
make such identifications increasingly difficult to cultivate.
There is
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an implicit side to Hardin's liberalism which is unacknowledged in his
defense of abortion on demand. This implicit side is typical of most
family and population planners and feminists. When the underside is not
made explicit, it encourages pro-abortionists to misunderstand, and
criticize those who choose not to support liberalized abortion laws.
Hardin is the most prominent example of this tendency, perhaps, but it
exists for most pro-abortionists.
Perhaps one of the most valuable results of a re-engagement of
liberals with anti-abortionists in the controversy would be acknowledg-
ment of this aspect.
Finally, Hardin insists upon and claims that his position on abortion
is an objective one which any neutral observer could accept. In actuality,
however, Hardin has universalized his own way of life.
The celebration of affluence, of technological advance, of the small
number but well-educated offspring, are certainly not prominent features of
working class family life.
The social sciences, as I have already argued, are interpretive
sciences. The social scientist has accepted some assumptions about human
nature and rejected others, whether or not she makes this explicit. So,
Hardin cannot claim that his are neutral observations. In his particular
case, he could strengthen the plausibility of his claim by opposing them
to others, and gauging whether or not his claims make more sense. Though
this will not give a definitive interpretation (this cannot be a goal in
the social sciences) , it can guard against interpretations which have no
rational basis whatsoever. And it can protect the interpreter from
universalizing his or her own way of life and hence misinterpreting others.
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Judith Jarvis Thompson
Judith Thompson, like Garrett Hardin, has tried to illuminate some
of the less-discussed aspects of the pro-abortion position. And her work,
like Hardin's, is particularly instructive for the way it suggests the
poverty of the liberalism it explicitly celebrates. Consider, for
example, her defense of the right to abortion.
Thompson argues that the right to life is not nearly so unprob-
lematic as right-to-lifers would have us believe. More specifically,
Thompson's argument is that "having a right to life does not guarantee
having a right to be given the use of another's body - even if (the
14fetus) needs it for life itself."
The right to life consists "not in the right not to be killed, but
rather in the right not to be killed unjustly.""*"^ An unjust killing,
presumably, is one in which the mother kills her fetus after having
invited it to make use of her body, and the fetus, once conceived, does
not threaten her physical or emotional health. Or, more simply, having
the right to life, and being able to continue to live, are not the same
things
.
The right to life, says Thompson, is a natural right: it exists
independently of whether or not it is actually granted by one human
being to another. Whereas actually being given the means to sustain
life is something which must be willingly extended to one person by
another. It is this, and only this explicit contraction for the care and
sustenance of another which is legally binding. If, for example, we
make a contract with another person to keep that person alive, we must
honor that contract unless extraordinary circumstances prevent us from
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doing so. If we do not fulfill that contract, we have killed unjustly.
On this view, it is not a contradiction to say that while a fetus has
a right to life, its mother does not necessarily have to provide it with
what it needs to live. Unless she has assumed, implicitly or explicitly,
"special responsibility" for fulfilling its right to life, she has no
legal responsibility for keeping it alive. If- she does abort the fetus,
she has not killed unjustly and she has not violated its right to life.
According to Thompson, even if a mother has accepted responsibility
explicitly for caring for her fetus, she is no longer legally obligated
to carry it to term if this would require large sacrifices of her.
Thompson's main purpose in defending "rights" in this way is to
separate from the concept any notion of "ought." For Thompson, "rights"
is not a moral concept. Although some people do use the term in such a
way that it follows from it that a right ought to be granted, Thompson
considers this "an unfortunate loosening of what we would do better to
keep a tight rein on.""*"^ She is challenging those who argue, for
example, that since the fetus has a right to life, and since it must
exist within the mother in order to live, the mother "ought" to let it
do so
.
Although Thompson agrees that there may be times when a person
ought to do something, when "it would be callous, self-centered and
indecent to refuse" (for example, to let another use my body for an
hour when this brief use of it would save that person's life and not
endanger my own) , I would not be acting unjustly if I refused the
request. I have not killed unjustly (even though I am the only one who
can keep this person alive) unless I have agreed at some point that
his
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welfare is my burden. Outside of such a contract, this person can make
no claim on me to grant his right to life.
But this conception of rights is problematic for several reasons.
First of all, in our ordinary use of the concept "rights" we do not sever
from it any notion of moral responsibility. When we say that someone
has a right to something, we are also saying that unless there are
overriding reasons, there is an obligation to provide for the exercise
of that right. The contract for exercision is built into the concept
itself. The obligation to honor the exercision of that right does not,
in our ordinary use of that term, exist apart from the right (as Thompson
would have it) so that first, there are rights, and then perhaps , some
obligation to fulfill them.
The concept "rights" in our ordinary use of it, is formed from the
moral point of view. There is a rich background of moral claims, duties,
responsibilities, on which rights are built, upon which the concept
depends. The moral point of view is built into the concept rights so
that it is nonsensical to suggest that we have rights but no reason to
expect them honored.
When Thompson severs the connection between rights and morality, she
forces us to ask the point of rights in her scheme. She is using the
concept in a way we ordinarily do not, and we should expect a justifica-
tion for her preferred usage.
Second, even if we assume that the concept is not formed from the
moral point of view, Thompson's account is still problematic. For
she
assumes that it will be relatively easy to decide who has assumed
"special
responsibility" for their fulfillment and who has not. But in the
examples
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Thompson uses of where there is a question of legal responsibility
(when, for example, a mother who originally wanted her child aborts
it when she is eight months pregnant) Thompson implies that we must
"fall back" on our traditional moral standards of what appropriate
behavior should be. Thompson makes implicit use of a connection between
morality and rights which she explicitly denies.
Consider, for example, her argument that in some instances it
would be "morally indecent," though not a violation of its rights, for
a pregnant woman to abort her fetus. Thompson argues that it would be
morally indecent for a pregnant woman to abort her seven month old
fetus to enjoy more fully a Caribbean cruise, or for a rape victim to
abort her thirty-eight week old fetus."^"^
Similarly, she argues that it would be morally indecent if I
refused to save your life when all I had to do to save you would be to
walk ten yards to you and touch your head. We expect that I would make
such a minimal effort for such a maximum benefit, but neither you
nor the victim has a right to expect a minimum of decency from me.
But in these examples, Thompson is trading in on ideas and beliefs
most of us share about the way our way of life should be. These ideas
and beliefs are moral in the sense that they are important features of
our prized way of life and without them our way of life would be some-
thing less - coarser, less decent.
Often these moral requirements change in response to other changes
in the way of life; some of them seem never to change; some of them
never
become part of the legal system. They are, instead, woven into
the fabric
of our society through custom, convention, tradition. Living
by these
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is an important feature of the way of life - even though they are not
always part of the legal system.
Thompson argues that everyday civilities we accord one another
continue to exist alongside our more formal rights. We can understand
her use of "morally indecent" in this way. She can make no connection,
though, between these "moral indecencies" and the proper exercise of
rights. Thompson embraces a legalistic, individualistic, conception
of rights which is at odds with the social practice of rights.
Consider, for example, Hegel's criticisms of the utilitarian model
of rights Thompson adopts. In civil society, Hegel claims, men relate
to one another as individuals and as individual bearers of rights. Each
individual seeks his or her own fulfillment, though this requires working
with others
.
But Hegel cautioned against sole identification with civil society.
Without some identification beyond civil society, individuals can be
expected to lose their sense of self-respect and respect for others,
and become a "heap" or "rabble."
Civil society is kept in balance only by its members identifying
with others at different levels - both in the family (where members share
love and commitments based on feeling) and through the state.
A society based on utilitarian principles alone could not survive.
Modern societies like our own where utilitarian principles are encouraged
and expressed in many of our institutions and practices carry on by
"coasting" on traditional allegiances to them and the way of life they
symbolize; and by creating visions which transcend the mere consideration
of utility which are its supposed official guide.
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Thompson's expression of an individualist conception of rights
depends implicitly on the woman's (in the case of abortion) under-
standing and use of traditional, extra-legal, moral practices. Thomp-
son assumes, for example, that the absolute right of the mother to
destroy her fetus is accompanied by a sense of decency which will
discourage the wanton destruction of early life.
But the structures for developing this sense of decency, I shall
argue more fully below, are undermined, weakened, by the individualist,
truncated policies Thompson celebrates. She condones a way of life in
which, for example, the father of an unborn child has no right to decide
whether or not it shall live; yet she is confident that, should the
unborn child need its father for a blood transfusion, he would gladly
oblige
.
Her explicit celebration of individual rights, often at the
expense of traditional family life, assumes implicitly the durable,
loving bonds of traditional family life. Her legalism is dependent
upon moral custom even as it jeopardizes it.
Strict attention to one level, that of individual rights, moreover,
keeps the analysis of social life at a very abstract level. This can
encourage a misunderstanding of the effects of individual rights in more
concrete social practices.
I have mentioned already the ways in which the right to elective
abortion has become for many the obligation to abort. This change has
also occurred with the right to die and the right to amniocentesis.
Amniocentesis, for example, is promoted as that test which enables
families to produce only the healthiest of children, a particular
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benefit to those parents who already have a Down's Syndrome child. In
this procedure, fluid is taken from the amniotic sac to test for genetic
abnormalities
.
Its acceptance by parents implies an acceptance of new, liberal
standards of health, standards which exclude those infants with handi-
caps of most sorts.
The very existence of amniocentesis, of the state's willingness
(indeed, eagerness) to subsidize it, and the state's responsibility
(in most instances) for subsidizing the care of Down's Syndrome children,
contribute to pressuring parents into considering the right to amnio-
centesis as the obligation to undergo it.
I know from personal experience the pressures medical authorities
can and do put on the parents of a Down's Symdrome child not to chance
the birth of another one. This pressure, in turn, can contribute to
changes in the shape of the family relationship.
Paul Ramsey suggests, for example, that the bond of trust between
parents and child is weakened by the very decision to undergo amnio-
centesis. For the parents must contemplate seriously the destruction of
their offspring before the test is even administered. The mere considera-
19
tion weakens the parental identity as protectors of their offspring.
The parent-child bond of trust is also jeopardized if there are
siblings involved. If the parents are undergoing amniocentesis because
an existing child has a genetic defect, this child might well think that
her parents would have preferred, had they had the opportunity, to abort
her. The bond of trust might be eroded as well when the child born after
a negative amniocentesis test is informed of the test when she is older.
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Ramsey argues that the parent-child bond of unquestioned affection
and trust, which sustains the relationship throughout a lifetime, is
diminished in its quality and content by the very decision to undergo
amniocentesis. In his interviews with parents in the process of under-
going the procedure, Ramsey found that most distanced themselves from
the nascent child prior to a notification of the results, and none
would even consider the possibility of a false diagnosis of Down's
Syndrome (and therefore the abortion of a normal infant)
.
Analagous observations have been made about the decision to abort.
The very consideration of the destruction of the nascent life weakens
the bond between parent and child (and may well weaken the relationship
between parents and other children). In Magda Dene's observations in
a New York abortion clinic, for example, many women six to seven months
pregnant, were claiming that they had never felt fetal movement, even
though most women feel the fetus quite strongly by the fifth month of
pregnancy. The disassociation from the fetus was so great, or the need
to disassociate was so essential to the consideration of abortion, that
20
many women acted, literally, as if there were no life there.
This distancing and weakening of mother-child, parent-child bond
affects the way medical authorities treat the live births which often
result from late abortions. In the absence of any indication that the
child is wanted by its parents, many doctors and nurses present at the
live births do not feel compelled to try to save the infants' lives. As
one nurse said to me, "I know the mother doesn't want it, so I take my
time getting it to the intensive care nursery."
The situation at the other end of the spectrum - that of the
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terminally ill - is similar. The existence of life-support equipment,
the right to allow patients to die, changing standards which prize the
painless death, the enormous cost of maintaining life-support equipment
and the burden of the cost being a state responsibility in most cases,
contribute to a deterioration of family bonds.
The medical authorities must be consulted; the cost to the sur-
vivors must be kept in mind; the family must weigh the emotional and
monetary cost of keeping a member alive against the amount of suffering
a member is undergoing and against the wishes of the patient.
In all instances, that of amniocentesis, abortion, and elaborate
life-support systems, the existence of new technology and the pressure
to use it (encouraged by liberal standards of health) can contribute to
a weakening of family bonds when they can withstand it least.
The existence of outside medical authorities to whom the family
must appeal, the pressure to view the right to the use of the new tech-
nology as an obligation to make use of it, diminishes the privacy of the
family unit, the confidence of its members to meet the needs of its sick
or disabled members, and the natural trust and affection that the mem-
bers' welfare will always be a foremost consideration.
The sense of and capacity for responsibility diminishes not only
with the availability of and pressure to make use of new technology,
but also in conjunction with the results of other aspects of liberal
ideology. It is difficult to care for one's elderly parents, for example,
when doing so would mean moving to an area where employment opportunities
would diminish one's income and perhaps the possibility of providing
adequate care.
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When discussions of individual rights remain at an abstract level
they miss the changes which often occur in everyday situations which
deform that right, often changing it to an obligation and diminishing
the social bonds of those participating in that right.
The abstract quality of Thompson's work is dependent, too, on her
assumption that this abstract level of analysis ensures that her argu-
ments are neutral. In fact, she, like Hardin, universalizes her own
beliefs
.
The casualness of her treatment of the person who would refuse
to do the bare minimum to save another's life would certainly horrify
most of those outside the university circles of speculation, as would
giving priority to individual rights over family stability threaten
many working class and traditional people. Thompson's strict
individualism, while popular, is not neutral, but a reflection of her
own assumptions and beliefs about "the good society."
3 . Conclusion
The explicitness of Garrett Hardin and Judith Jarvis Thompson's
remarks have helped to illuminate the weaknesses and dilemmas of the
pro-abortionists' position. They show how this position is dependent,
in part, upon a set of practices and beliefs which are part of the
working class ideal, which are incompatible with the more individualist
aspects of liberalism.
This ultimate incompatibility is a key reason for the participants
in the abortion controversy to compromise. Pro-abortionists could, on
reflection, see the inner rationality of at least some aspects of anti-
abortionism.
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First, there is their refusal to draw a line establishing the
particular point of fetal development at which the fetus becomes a
person. This is implicit in most pro-abortion arguments. Even Planned
Parenthood, perhaps the most prominent group to support abortion on
demand and to deny the early personhood of the fetus
, celebrated its
personhood only a decade or so ago. In its 1964 brochure, the organiza-
tion asks: "Is (contraception) abortion? Definitely not. An abortion
21kills the life of a baby after it has begun."
And second, pro-abortionists could, on reflection, understand how
traditional family life has features which are important to the promotion
of morally developed and responsible citizens. The pro-abortionists
would not have to grant total rationality to the traditional way of
life, but grant that it has some legitimacy and rationality to it.
These critiques of Thompson and Hardin (and in the larger sense,
pro-abortionism) could cultivate some ground for the anti-abortionists
to compromise . Perhaps though , they could not see completely the
legitimacy of a way of life which promotes broad individual rights,
they could see sufficient rationale to tolerate it.
In my final chapter, I shall explore the possibilities for
compromise
.
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CHAPTER V
THE DIMENSIONS OF A COMPROMISE
1- An Abstract Case For Compromise
In a policy which promotes competing ways of life there are bound
to be conflicts, such as that over abortion, which are not amenable to
simple negotiation. Yet, these conflicts often evoke such intense
feelings and beliefs that all parties agree that a state policy is
needed to control the conflict. The ability of the state to respond is
shaped, in part, by the ability of all parties to see, upon reflection,
some rationality to the opponent's way of life.
This rationality may not be immediately evident. It is possible,
for example, for one party to find it difficult to see a plausible
defense of a competing way of life because the ideas and beliefs of
its participants have been widely misinterpreted. Or perhaps, the
ideas and beliefs which support a particular position have not been
sufficiently publicly articulated. An essential preliminary to the
settlement of such a conflict may be the public expression of the less
articulated position to ensure it as much coherence and rationality as
inspires it.
In such a conflict, there may be arguments and considerations on
both sides which are not resolvable, and it may well be that neither
side can understand the other side perfectly. But, if there is some
mutual respect for the beliefs of all parties, and a shared belief that
there is a possibility of deep social disaffection resulting from the
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conflict which outweighs the necessity of perfect compromise, the state
is in a position to encourage a compromise.
The compromise may not speak to the highest ideals of the society.
Its justification lies, instead, in the fact that all parties agree that
no set of beliefs, or way of life, is without some justification, and
that support is owed those public policies intended to maintain at least
the minimum of integrity necessary to preserve all ways of life. The
potential political compromise is morally justified even though it
probably will not be cause for moral celebration.
2. The Specific Instance of Abortion
What, specifically, are the possibilities for compromise on abor-
tion policies in the United States? There are, to be sure, intense
feelings and beliefs about the issues by all participants. And there is
agreement on the need for a state policy to control contraceptive prac-
tice and abortion.
The dimensions of a compromise for which the state could expect
widespread support are set by two conditions. The first is the willing-
ness and ability of the participants to try to understand why their
opponents see abortion as vitally affecting their way of life, and why
the way of life is so precious that abortion policy must be shaped to
protect it. The second factor is the current role of the state in many
aspects of family life.
As I have argued, the major participants in the abortion contro-
versy seem to have very little understanding of and respect for the
positions of their opponents. Pro-abortionists have misunderstood the
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role of the family in the working class way of life and have failed to
see working class anti-abortionism as, in part, a defense of that life.
They have not understood how their anti-abortionism is a rational
response to protect their sense of self.
The popularization of the pro-abortionist position that all or most
anti-abortionists are power-obsessed, women-hating, religious fanatics
has only increased the hostility and alienation of anti-abortionists and
diminished the grounds for compromise.
And the anti-abortionists, on the defensive but without acknowledged
grounds for compromise, have not sympathetically reviewed the beliefs of
pro-abortionists about the need to make abortion available.
The most promising approach to promoting a sympathetic dialogue
between the two parties is to delineate and insist upon, publicly, the
inner rationality of the less articulated (anti-abortionist) position, and
to call attention to aspects of the working class way of life which many
pro-abortionists implicitly embrace.
As I have argued, there are several good reasons for expecting that
a public articulation of the inner rationality of the anti-abortionist
position would encourage sympathy for it. And there are good reasons for
supposing that feminists and planners would, on reflection, admit that
many of their beliefs about abortion, family life and liberalism would
be destructive of the liberal ideal if not supported in practice by
beliefs central to traditional ways of life. Ideally, feminists and
planners would come to understand how, in their arguments for abortion,
they have illicitly universalized their own ways of life and have badly
misinterpreted important aspects of the anti-abortion movement as a
consequence
.
So, in addition to widespread agreement that a state policy on
contraception and abortion is essential, and some possible grounds for
promoting compromise, we need to ask if participants are willing and able
to respect each other's positions enough to grant them the minimal amount
of legitimacy which would be essential to a compromise, and then to ask
if the state could fashion a compromise which would accord each some
legitimacy while addressing its own needs.
The possibility for compromise requires some speculation, most
importantly because the anti-abortionist position is so narrowly
defined and insufficiently articulated. But the speculation can be con-
trolled by exploring the way a reasonably similar society, like France,
has handled the compromise , and by setting out the existing evidence
for supposing that a compromise is not out of the question.
To begin, the fact that several prominent American pro-abortionists
have changed their positions bodes well for a compromise. And the fact
that their sympathies were broadened by more attention to the issues of
fetal personhood and the legitimate state limits on personal rights, en-
courages my suspicions that these two concerns will provide the dimensions
of a compromise.
It is more difficult to gauge the willingness of anti-abortionists
to embrace a compromise which would give ascendant rights to the mother
over her unborn child and over her spouse. The gross misinterpretation
of the anti-abortionist position by pro-abortionists and the media has
encouraged a hostility toward compromise by at least some anti-abortion-
ists. But some prominent spokespeople are arguing that a political com-
promise is probably the most promising route toward ending the wanton.
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if not all, destruction of unborn human life.
Joseph Sobran, one of the most prominent non-Catholic anti-
abortionists, argues that given the obstacles which the anti-abortionists
face, their most promising political move is toward establishing the
principle that abortion is wrong and hope that in time this will "dispose
men's minds toward the acceptance of abortion in the long run." Sobran
believes that laws can educate the citizenry, and that the public, legal
acknowledgment of the personhood of the fetus, at some future point in
time, might discourage, at least, the use of abortion as a contraceptive
of first resort.
And Paul Ramsey, a scholar from Princeton who has written extensively
on abortion, is arguing that even amidst deep hostility toward anti-
abortionists, there are some grounds for compromise. Ramsey is pressing
for laws, in the spirit of Roe v. Wade, which would charge doctors with
equal care of potentially viable fetuses whether or not they are the
products of induced abortions . More specifically, Ramsey is arguing that
the states mandate the use of prostaglandins in induced abortions, as
they tend to produce more live infants than in the saline induced
abortions most commonly performed now. Ramsey suggests that even though
the Supreme Court is interested only in the health of the mother , its
1973 decisions leave some leeway for state laws aimed at protecting the
older aborted fetuses. This would be in keeping, moreover, with the
position of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists which
has always maintained that the primary purpose of abortions is not to kill
2
the fetus.
The willingness of both Sobran and Ramsey to consider seriously
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compromises at odds with their personal convictions suggests that many
other anti-abortionists might be able to support a state-sponsored
compromise. My experiences with working class women suggest that they
would be willing to support a compromise which is geared toward the pro-
tection of the unborn and the traditional family.
Although the specifics of a compromise which could command broad
support would be dependent upon reactions about which we can only
hazard a guess, the French abortion laws might serve as a model for our
own compromise.
3
.
The French Abortion Compromise
The French abortion laws are designed to "respect life, assist
women in physical danger, provide every woman with optimum conditions
for keeping her child, and allow individuals and doctors freedom of
..3
conscxence
.
The law guarantees the respect of every human being
from the beginning of life. There shall be no infringe-
ment of this principle except in case of necessity and
according to the conditions defined by present law."^
The emphasis on respect for life "from the beginning" sets the moral
tone of French abortion legislation. All parties to the abortion con-
troversy in France agree that the unborn fetus is a human being from
the moment of conception, and that the decision to abort is a moral
decision.
The laws are designed to allow only those women to abort for whom
carrying the pregnancy to term would be an "unbearable distress."
Though in the last analysis, the choice for abortion is the pregnant
woman's, she must follow a set of procedures designed to make abortion
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the least attractive option.
She must, first of all, approach a physician, who must:
1. Inform her of the medical risks she runs for herself and for
her future pregnancies.
2. Deliver to the woman a dossier containing:
a. A list of the rights, assistance, and advantages
guaranteed by the Family Law to mothers, unmarried or not, and to
their children, as well as the possibilities offered by the adoption
of a baby to be born.
b. A list of organizations which can give her additional
counseling.
The woman must then consult an "information, consultation, or family
counseling service, or center for family planning or education, a social
service or other approved organization which is to issue her an attesta-
tion of the consultation."^
This consultation includes a private interview in the course of which
aid and advice appropriate to the situation of the woman concerned is
provided for her, in addition to the necessary resources for resolving
the social problems faced. Wherever possible, couples are encouraged
to participate in the decision to be made.
3. If the woman, following these consultations, renews her request
for an abortion, the physician requests a written confirmation no sooner
than one week after the woman's first request.
4. Finally, if the woman is an unmarried minor, the consent of
one of the persons exercising parental authority, or the legal guardian,
is required.
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The abortion must be performed by the tenth week of pregnancy.
There is some hostility in France toward this compromise. There are those,
for example, who oppose the public funding of the abortions. Others
think the restrictions are too strict, while some argue that they are
too liberal. Most agree that the laws have had the intended effect
of restricting abortions.
A compromise based on the French model would be likely to meet more
resistance in the United States.
First of all, abortion is a lucrative business here. The French
effectively prevented this by restricting the performance of abortions
to public and private hospitals. But, if Bernard Nathanson's accounts
of the greed he encountered by most of those involved in abortion clinics
is any evidence, we can expect strong opposition to such a compromise by
pharmaceutical companies and the owners and operators of abortion clinics.
Second, the Supreme Court's decision that the early fetus is not a
person with rights makes the acceptance of a proposal featuring the
respect for the early fetus, more difficult to cultivate than it was in
France. Although all parties to the American controversy act implicitly
as if the fetus is a person worthy of respect, most feminists and liberals
will not embrace this publicly.
There are, as I have argued, reasons for maintaining that liberals
and feminists could and' should agree to support laws which stress the
moral impact of the decision to abort.
The willingness and ability of all participants to compromise could
be enhanced by a re-opening of dialogue between the parties with a con-
centration on the issues of fetal personhood and the family. It is
109
essential that the anti-abortion position be presented as part of a par-
ticular way of life, and not, restrictively
, as a set of religious
beliefs
.
4. The Role of the State
The final important factor in a compromise is, of course, the
state itself, and the fact that it is already well-insinuated in American
family life. Our welfare state assist mothers without other means of
support, pays for some abortions, and shapes family policy in general.
Many anti-abortionists have argued that the state's interference
in family life weakens it, and that this is particularly true of current
abortion policy. A key goal for anti-abortionists is a withdrawal of the
state from its overwhelming influence in family life.
Allan Carlson, writing in support of this view, charges that recent
efforts by the state, in a variety of contexts, to strengthen the family
have had the opposite effect. Lewis Coser's study on Stalin's attempts •
to strengthen the family, for example, concluded that his very inter-
ference in family affairs undermined parental authority. And recent
research on the effects of Sweden's marriage-loan act, intended to
encourage earlier marriage and more children per family, actually pro-
duced families with fewer children than in those families not helped
by the state.
And while defensive explanation abound, the fact remains
that the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
experiments with income-maintenance programs have seen
divorce, separation, and desertion figures significantly
higher than among control families receiving no benefits.
The disconcerting reality appears to be that state social
intervention on behalf of families actually weakens or
destroys families
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But even if the anti-abortionists were able to make their case
against state intervention per se , it might still be the case that, at
this point, the state could not withdraw from all its functions in family
life without causing serious dislocations anti-abortionists would not,
on reflection, support.
For many anti-abortionists who call for a diminished state presence
in family life miss the extent to which some families are dependent upon
it for those resources traditional families are able to provide for
themselves. Many women cannot rely on faithful and dependable spouses
and extended families to help them rear their children.
Many pregnant teenagers have neither the traditional moral parental
support to guide them in their sexual experiences nor the parental
support to help them carry their pregnancies to term. In many ways,
the way of life which anti-abortionists celebrate is in eclipse; and
should the state relinquish its support of many who look to it for
assistance, there would be no other institution (most particularly, the
traditional family) to assist most of them.
Unless most anti-abortionists were willing to concede that the
state is already well insinuated in the family life and that its abrupt
withdrawal could hurt our weakest citizens, it is unlikely that a com-
promise could be fashioned which would receive broad support. But it
is quite conceivable that anti-abortionists would be able and willing
to support measures which, while recognizing the immediate need of
state assistance to families and communities which are relatively
stable and intact, and at reviewing public policies in light of their
consequences for traditional family life.
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It might be argued, for example, that proposed public housing
projects which disrupt community and neighborhood life, or employment
policies which require workers to accept positions involving frequent,
distant moves, be criticized, revised, perhaps shelved, in light of
their effect on strong family life.
The state's ability to fashion a compromise is shaped in part by
its commitment to assist families, by its liberal notion of what con-
stitutes a family, and by the fact that these have encouraged ways of
family life which could not exist now without state support. The most
promising compromise, in my view, would be one which recognized the legit-
imacy of traditional (e.g., working class) families and which gave their
continued existence some priority, while not immediately abandoning its
commitment to support a wide spectrum of groupings identifying them-
selves as families.
There are good reasons for believing that a compromise modelled
after the French compromise and with acknowledgment of the legitimacy
of traditional family life, could, in time, win broad support.
Feminists and planners would have to reason to support it because
it would acknowledge the personhood of the fetus while also recognizing
that the final decision to abort must be the pregnant woman's. And
the compromise would insist that since the right to decide belongs
equally to all women, no woman would be denied the right to abort
because she could not afford this procedure. The state would have to
provide public funding for women who cannot otherwise afford to abort.
The compromise is one which working class people should be able to
tolerate, if not celebrate, because it is based on the importance of
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respect for the unborn and for traditional family life. It is struc-
tured to eliminate, as much as possible, frivolous abortions, and to
encourage women (with substantial support from public and private
agencies when needed) to carry their pregnancies to term. Finally, the
provisions require that unmarried minors seek the consent and, presumably,
moral guidance of their families.
The compromise would, of course, require the funding of medicaid
abortions. But the rationale for providing the funding would be that
this was a choice of last resort and a serious moral choice, thus, ideally
accentuating the importance of the unborn child. This is in contrast
to current claims by feminists that the state must fund abortions merely
because it cannot discriminate against the poor.
Ideally, the compromise would restrict the use of abortion as a
contraceptive of first resort; and would promote laws charging physicians
with equal care of fetuses born alive, whether or not they were the
products of induced abortions.
Obviously, a compromise which discourages abortion requires that
provisions be made for those women, unsupported by others, who choose to
carry their pregnancies to term.
There are many private agencies which are able to provide these
services, and we can expect them to be given increased support from
the private sector should such a compromise be accepted. But, at least
for the immediate future, we would have to expect the continuance of
government assistance, like AFDC, for those women with no other means
of supporting their children.
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.
Conclusions
In my dissertation, I have argued that there are good reasons for
most participants in the abortion controversy to try to compromise; and
that there is sufficient raw material for a morally informed political
compromise
.
I have argued that the most formidable obstacle to a settlement
has been a misreading of the intentions and a strength of their
opponents by the pro-abortionists.
Most feminists and planners have assumed that the anti-abortion
movement is comprised for the most part, of a small but powerful group
of men who feel threatened by the freedom of abortion-on-demand gives
women
.
Most recent research suggests, instead, that the movement is com-
prised of men and women from many religions and backgrounds. But, most
importantly, in terms of effect
, the anti-abortion movement is supported
by most working class people.
I have tried to illuminate how abortion-on-demand threatens the
ideal of working class family life, and the self-understanding of working
class people in their most important relationships - family relationships.
Even though not all, or even perhaps most, working class people are faith-
ful to the ideal, it is widely embraced and used as a standard to assess
conduct
•
The ideal cherishes family stability, and the importance of long-term,
unconditional commitments, to friends, community and family members.
The feminists and planners, who are the most vocal of the pro-
abortionists, base their support on the need for individual freedom and
rights, which threaten the working class ideal by undermining parental
authority, and the ability to respect all life whatever its stage of
development
.
But most feminists and planners, I have argued, assume implicitly,
the need for social practices such as those which encourage durable
family and community life, which their explicit policies help to under-
mine .
Most pro-abortionists also recognize the impossibility of drawing
a line at any point during its growth when the fetus changes from a
non-person to a person.
The implicit side of the pro-abortionist argument has not been
illuminated because of their withdrawal from public debate following
the 1973 Supreme Court decisions. The features, though, provide the
raw material for compromise with the anti-abortionists.
The French abortion laws could serve as a model for our compromise.
They are based, foremost, on respect for unborn life, and secondly,
though importantly, on the mother's right not to carry a distressful
pregnancy to term.
I have argued that we can expect some obstacles to acceptance of a
compromise. Some feminists, for example, celebrate a way of life so
opposed to the nuclear and extended family norms and to male/female
relationships in general, that we might expect opposition to any attempts
to restrain the absolute right of women to abort, and to strengthen the
traditional family.
In addition, we can expect opposition from private abortion clinics
and the pharmaceutical companies who have an enormous stake in the
practice of abortion.
Finally, the liberal agenda for the family would have to be
reviewed in light of the abortion compromise to illuminate its implicit
side.
But, there are good reasons for arguing that participants have an
obligation at least to reopen public debate on liberal abortion laws.
The acknowledged weaknesses of the Supreme Court decisions on
abortion (acknowledged even by some pro-abortionists) ; the increasing
momentum of the Right-to-Life movement; and the fact that an entire
way of life is being threatened by the liberal laws, are good reasons
for claiming that both the pro- and anti-abortionists have a moral obli-
gation to try to work out a compromise. The fact that there are grounds
for such a compromise, increases the obligation.
And, as I have argued, since the state is already very implicated
in family life, even though its presence may well contribute toward its
weakening, a compromise will probably maintain a state presence in the
family, if not increase it in some instances.
Without state assistance, efforts to limit abortions are likely to
jeopardize most those already living on the fringes of society.
We can insist, though, that public policies be made with the effect
on family life in mind, and that, if policies do not improve that quality
of family life, at least they do not impair it.
The compromise I have suggested is not ideal; but we can expect,
ideally, from the compromise, a generalized respect for the unborn which
would encourage couples to contracept responsibly; that doctors treat all
fetuses with equal respect and care; and that citizens and policymakers
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be willing to formulate public policies which encourage durable family
and civic relationships.
Finally, I have tried to suggest that there are reasons why some
may not want to compromise, at least not in the immediate future. The
most striking aspect of my research has been the tremendous hostility
of pro- and anti-abortionists toward one another. This has led more than
a few of them to suggest the impossibility of compromise. I could
speculate that a compromise, if it were to come about, would be years
in the making.
The misinterpretations have been so gross and the range of debate
so narrow, that the dialogue itself will have to be reshaped before the
opponents can begin to have a measure of respect for one another. But
there are some reasons for expecting that this might occur. Most impor-
tant among them is the fact that both prominent anti- and pro-abortionists
have suggested compromise as the morally expedient path.
The possibilities for compromise could be widened if the debate
were renewed and, particularly, if working class anti-abortionism were
expressed as part of a larger set of beliefs about the importance of
traditional family relationships.
The immediate possibilities for compromise are quite grim. But
since there are grounds for a compromise, means for promoting it, and
the possible outcome of a more cohesive policy, there are good reasons
for insisting that a compromise be attempted.
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